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Abstract
Despite the tendency for multinational corporations to overexploit natural
resources and pollute the Earth, the immense power of capital in a globalizing world has
presented a unique opportunity for corporations to become drivers for positive global
environmental change. To make sense of this puzzle, this study asks how does an
international environmental regime’s relationship to the economic marketplace impact its
institutional and ecological effectiveness? Through a small-n case study, this project
analyzes the historical context, market interactions, and regime outcomes of four distinct
instances of global environmental governance: the stratospheric ozone regime, the
climate change regime, the global oceanic regime, and the biodiversity regime. By using
indicators from both traditional and contemporary regime theory literature, each regime is
coded as market-enabling or regulatory and its effectiveness is evaluated. These
narratives indicate that both market-enabling regimes and regulatory regimes alike may
face pushback from state and corporate actors that compromises the regime’s institutional
and ecological effectiveness. However, this oppositional stance may change when the
cost of defecting from regime provisions exceeds the cost of compliance. Marketenabling features, coupled with technological advancements, enforcement mechanisms,
and a concentrated regime structure, establishes conditions under which corporations may
choose to abide by environmental regime provisions.

Résumé
Malgré les tendances des multinationales à exploiter les ressources naturelles et
polluer la Terre, la force immense du capital dans un monde globalisé a présenté une
opportunité unique pour les entreprises de devenir des motrices du changement positif de
l’environnement. Pour comprendre ce mystère, cette étude pose la question « comment
est-ce-que le lien entre un régime international environnemental et le marché économique
avoir un impact sur l’efficacité institutionnelle et écologique du régime ? » Avec une
étude de case, ce projet analyse le contexte historique, les interactions au sein du marché,
et les résultats du quatre exemples de gouvernance globale environnementale : le régime
de l’ozone stratosphérique, le régime du changement climatique, le régime des océans, et
le régime de la biodiversité. En utilisant des indicateurs de la littérature de la théorie des
régimes, chaque régime est codé comme étant celui qui permet les activités du marché or
celui qui les régule. Enfin, l’efficacité de chaque est évalué. Ces exemples indiquent que
les régimes habilitants ainsi que les régimes réglementaires peuvent faire face à résistance
des acteurs du gouvernement et de l’entreprise qui compromettent l’efficacité
institutionnelle et écologique du régime. Cependant, cette position oppositionnelle peut
changer quand le coût de défection des provisions du régime dépasse le coût de
compliance. Les caractéristiques d’un régime habilitant, couplé aux avancements
technologiques, les mécanismes de surveillance, et un design du régime concentré,
établissent les conditions dans lesquelles les entreprises peuvent choisir de respecter des
provisions du régime environnemental international.
i
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Chapter 1: Introduction
DuPont, the hegemonic chemical company headquartered in Wilmington, Delaware, may
not be the first thought that comes to mind when considering environmental
sustainability. Rather, as one of the globe’s largest chemical companies, it may take quite
the opposite place. As one of the world’s largest producers of chlorofluorocarbons
(CFCs) in the 1980s, DuPont was one of the greatest single contributors to ozone
depletion (Maxwell and Briscoe 1997). With vested interests in protecting the CFC
industry to remain a leader, it would seem economically unwise for the firm to readily
participate in the search for solutions to the ozone depletion problem.
Nonetheless, during the negotiation process for global ozone governance, DuPont
publicly lobbied in favor of imposing regulations on ozone depleting substances (ODSs).
With the support from DuPont and other major chemical companies, the international
community signed the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Ozone Depleting Substances. This
agreement, in its over two decades of enforcement, has successfully moved global
corporations moved away from CFC production and consumption.
The case of DuPont and the Montreal Protocol demonstrates that although
international firms have historically been some of the largest contributors to
environmental degradation, some have chosen to bear the brunt of regulation for the
benefit of environmental change. Despite the historic tendency for corporations to
overexploit natural resources and pollute, the immense power of capital in a globalizing
world presents a unique opportunity for corporations to become drivers for positive
global environmental change.
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In order to understand the role that large international businesses, like DuPont,
can have in the crafting, implementation, and outcomes of global environmental
governance, scholars are actively studying the overlap of policy, economics, and ecology.
With a base in political science, this paper continues this exploration by asking the
following question: how does an international environmental regime’s relationship to the
economic marketplace impact its institutional and ecological effectiveness?

Chapter II is a deep dive into the body of academic literature surrounding the
development of contemporary regime theory. The discussion of the existing neo-liberal
and neo-Gramscian theoretical bases for current scholarship outlines how environmental
regime effectiveness has historically been measured. The historic gaps in the literature
have indicated an importance of distinguishing between regime outcome and impact, or
institutional and ecological effectiveness. Then, with a particular concentration on
multinational corporations, the chapter shifts its focus to the nuances of non-state actors
as participants in the regime negotiation, creation, and implementation processes.
Overall, this analysis of the literature uses relevant theories to situate the research
question and craft a theoretical argument.
Chapter III is an outline of the most-similar comparative case study method
deployed in the remainder of the study. The first section explains the selection process for
the four cases international environmental regimes, with two being market-enabling and
two being regulatory. These selections will allow for the assessment of the impact (or
lack of impact) of the two types of regime-market relationships on regime effectiveness.
By creating coding techniques and explaining their relationship to the literature, the
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chapter concludes with the full operationalization of the dependent and independent
variables.
Chapter IV is the full analysis of the four case studies: the stratospheric ozone
regime, the climate change regime, the global oceanic regime, and the biodiversity
regime. Each study begins with an overview of the context and background of the case.
Then follows a discussion of the regime-market relationship and a justification on the
coding of the regime as market-enabling or regulatory. An evaluation of the institutional
and ecological effectiveness of each international environmental regime leads into a
discussion of each case’s final conclusions.
Finally, Chapter V brings together the four case studies into a single discussion of
multinational corporations and the effectiveness of international environmental regimes.
The study, which aimed to define the relationship between these phenomena, does not
seem to point to direct correlation between the market-enabling nature of a regime and its
effectiveness, either in an institutional or ecological sense. Rather, the study’s findings
suggest that a firm’s cost analysis of market opportunities, rather than the presence of the
market opportunities themselves, may be driving corporate support for international
environmental regimes and impacting their levels of success. Other factors, such as the
available technologies, enforcement mechanisms, and nature of the regime fragmentation,
are also considered as relevant to regime effectiveness. Finally, the chapter considers the
methodological strengths and limitations of the study and suggests future routes for
research.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
This chapter provides an exploration of existing scholarship as it relates to international
environmental regimes and multinational corporations. Beginning with a discussion of
the origins of regime theory, the first section describes how the growing prominence of
global environmental governance has prompted the creation of an environmental
subsection of international regime theory. Then, the second section describes methods
employed by these environmental regime theory scholars to measure the success, or
effectiveness, of these institutionalized frameworks. The third section explores non-state
actors, particularly multinational corporations, as drivers in the creation of international
regimes. Finally, this review of the literature is synthesized into the study’s theoretical
argument and hypotheses.

I. Regime Theory
A. Old Regime Theory
Transboundary issues, such as global trade, security, and climate change, are
widespread and complex. With causes that transect international borders, the solutions to
these issues must be multifaceted and facilitate cooperation among a host of international
actors, from states to non-governmental organizations to corporate actors (Breitmeier
2013). In the classical realist tradition of international relations, the anarchic structure of
the international system and human tendency to seek domination leads states to inevitable
conflict (Morgenthau 1978, 3). This general preoccupation with individual powerbuilding leads to an unwillingness to cooperate for collective gains. This reluctance, in
turn, makes the prospect of solving transboundary issues, like the ones described above,
nearly impossible.
5

In the years following 1945, however, the global system saw a sharp increase in
cooperative efforts of states to mitigate global governance concerns through the creation
of political and social institutions. From a realist perspective, states may engage in
international cooperation if doing so was in their best power-building interest
(Morgenthau 1978). However, with an increasing prevalence of large-scale cooperative
efforts and a lack of scholarship to explain this phenomenon, international relations
scholars began crafting regime theory to “capture, describe, and analyse the totality of
cooperative efforts, assumptions, and behaviours in a given international issue area”
(Sterling-Folker 2016, 89).
Traditional regime theory is built upon the structural realist idea that state
behavior is “a function of the distribution of power among states” (Krasner 1982a, 499).
States act and react to the changing power dynamics in the international system, or the
relative power levels of states. This power, for structural realists, is equated to the
material capabilities, both latent and military of the state (Mearsheimer 2001). The wealth
of a state, thus, determines it ability to exercise influence over other states. In an anarchic
society, these material and military capabilities place states at odds with one another as
they drive decision making processes (Krasner 1982a, 497-8).
Regime theory, while similarly concerned with the consequences of state power
distribution, approaches the topic through a more neoliberal lens. Neoliberalism argues
that state actors are not trapped in a world of inevitable conflict but can act collectively to
“mitigate the negative impact of anarchy” (Sterling-Folker 2016, 89). With cooperation
as an attractive course of action, a stable global order is a real possibility for the
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international system. Neoliberal scholars, therefore, seek to understand the conditions
under which international cooperation can emerge and be sustained.
Regime theorists are interested in these instances of international cooperation
within the social and political institutions called international regimes. These regimes
emerge from the “combination of the distribution of power, shared interests, and
prevailing expectations and practices” of international actors (Keohane 1984, 14). These
factors, when taken together under certain conditions, can change the behaviors of states
toward the collective pursuit of cooperation. With the knowledge that international
regimes align state behaviors together, regime scholars argue that states may use these
institutions to their advantage. States may participate in the shaping of international
regimes as an exertion of their power (Krasner 1982a). Therefore, from a regime theory
perspective, the global distribution of state power is constructed by a series of complex
state interactions within these regime institutions.
While regime theory scholars generally agree that regimes have the power to
impact state behavior on an international level, regimes have been defined in a variety of
breadths. On a basic level, regimes are described as collections of rules, norms, and
decision-making procedures that serve as loose governance around an area of
international relations.1 While these regimes may take different forms depending on the
demands of the issues at hand, each intends to influence state behaviors, either by
voluntary or legal means, and reinforce global norms and behaviors (Krasner 1982b).
1

Krasner defines regimes as “implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures
around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations” (Krasner 1982b, 186).
Keohane interprets international regimes to be arrangements of “rules, norms, principles, and decisionmaking procedures” (Keohane 1984, 8). Young defines regimes as “clusters of rights, rules, and decisionmaking procedures that give rise to a social practice, assigns roles to participants in the practice, and guides
interactions among occupants of these roles” (Young et al. 2008, xxii).
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While they do have high set-up costs, established regimes gain stability over time due to
the growing acceptance of international procedures and behavioral patterns (Krasner
1982a, 502).
Some scholars saw the inability to formulate a single definition for the
phenomenon as a strike against the reliability of such a theory. Susan Strange, for
example, argued that regime theory scholarship proved to be “woolly” in her famous
critique of the field (1982, 479). Attributing the “woolliness” to the inability of regime
theory scholars to agree on a single definition of the concept and single methodology for
studying regime effectiveness, she argued that the regime theory literature was imprecise
in nature, value-based in practice, and static in application (Strange 1982). Because of
these reasons, she argued against the development of regime theory scholarship.
Many scholars also believe that the extension of regime theory into the neoliberal
tradition is unnecessary. They argue that the international institutions and regimes, as
argued in structural realism, are mechanisms by which powerful states continue to pursue
their own personal interest and increase their power capabilities. Regime theory, thus, can
be seen as a futile restatement of structural realism (Strange 1982, 341).
While Strange’s early critique of regime theory was a valid interpretation of the
scholarship, contemporary scholars of regime theory have strengthened the theory
through its continued expansion. In an attempt to appease the two sides of this debate,
Krasner explained regimes as intervening, interacting variables. In the international
system, basic causal variables (such as the distribution of power and state interest) lead to
related behaviors and outcomes. When a regime is implemented, it becomes an
intervening variable that can both be affected by the basic causal variables and affect the
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basic causal variables and the outcome of interest (Krasner 1982a, 500). This approach,
while complex, allows state power to still take a prominent role in the theory, while
looking at regimes as important causal variables as well.
Even in the face of criticism, regime theory scholars have moved forward in
recent decades, seeking to create consensus and streamline the study of regimes. While
regimes analysis is not capable of explaining the entirely of interaction around a global
issue area, the complex causal relationship is still valuable for understanding how
regimes are affected by and affect a variety of international factors (Young 2012). In
moving forward, scholars of regime theory have looked to address two important
expansions of the theory: the overlap of particular issue areas and the rising importance
of non-state actors in regime creation and implementation.

B. Environmental Regime Theory
In general, the early scholarship on regimes aimed to establish the study of
regimes as a legitimate academic pursuit. With the most high-profile institutions of the
post-1945 era focusing on security and economic governance, the early scholarship
revolved around on these issue areas. Krasner, in his early work, by explaining the
general relationship between regimes and state power (Krasner 1982a, 1982b).
Simultaneously, Keohane’s scholarship aimed to explain how interdependence in
international political economy could drive global cooperation in the form of regimes
(Keohane 1984). However, with global governance expanding toward the end of the
twentieth century, the growing network of international regimes allowed for the interplay
of different issue areas.

9

One particular area that saw significant development in regime formation toward
the end of the 20th century was environmental protection. While many smaller-scale,
regional environmental agreements were in effect already, the 1972 United Nations
Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE) in Stockholm was the first major
instance of transnational environmental governance (Downie 2015). 2 This conference
served as the initial push toward the development of a larger collection of international
environmental regimes.
In the decades since the UNCHE, the international system has seen environmental
regimes blossom in areas related to the stratospheric ozone, climate change, biodiversity,
desertification, toxic chemical use, and ocean pollution, among many others (Downie
2015). Within each of these regimes, one can find “international treaties and agreements,
intergovernmental organizations, binding and nonbinding norms and principles, relevant
national and local government institutions, and associated nongovernmental and private
institutions that define and implement policies in different issue areas” (Axelrod and
VanDeveer 2015, 4). These various structures, taken together, create a system of
governance that helps to dictate the environmental-related behaviors of state and nonstate actors.
Transnational issues, by nature, are difficult to solve. International actors face
significant barriers to creating successful institutionalized regimes. For transboundary
environmental issues, however, the international community faces a particularly hard
2

The UNCHE gathered 113 states to discuss the implications of climate issues on the international system.
While no binding agreements were adopted at this first conference, there were three notable advancements
for the future of environmental governance. Firstly, states set the precedent for multilateral diplomacy in
the realm of environmental issues. Secondly, it established the twenty-six principles of international
environmental law, including Principle 21 which upholds the importance of state sovereignty. Finally, the
conference led to the creation of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), which has since
been the base for international environmental negotiations (Axelrod and VanDeveer 2015; Downie 2015).
10

challenge. Some of the barriers to effective transboundary environmental policy are
outlined below.
First of the challenges arises from the range of contributors to environmental
degradation and the recipients of the resulting issues. Global environmental degradation
occurs because of the convergence of many actors’ behaviors on an international scale.
With contributors that transect international borders, the creation of solutions to
environmental issues requires the cooperation of many contributing actors, including
states, civil society, and multinational corporations (Downie 2015). This need for
complex global coordination is, in itself, a significant barrier to effective policy creation
and change.
Beyond this coordination challenge, however, is the reality that most damaging
environmental practices can be traced to “a small number of highly industrialised states
and firms operating within the triad of East Asia, North America and Europe” (Newell
1999, 1). While this selection of actors is the principle cause of climate disturbance, the
resulting environmental changes “extend far beyond the power centres of the global
economy” (Newell 1999, 1). The impact of environmental degradation, seeing no
borders, can have serious consequences around the globe, even for actors who may not
contribute to the severity of the issue. With this in mind, the creation of effective global
environmental governance is an issue of global justice.
This distinction between those who contribute to the problems and those are
harmed by the problems gives rise to a second barrier to the creation of effective
international environmental regimes. Because of the importance of respecting a state’s
jurisdiction in the post-Westphalian international system, there remains a tension between
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international environmental governance and state sovereignty. Early regime theory
establishes that a state’s choice to abide by either formal or informal regime rules or
norms requires the sacrificing of some of its sovereignty (Krasner 1982a). This
phenomenon is represented within issues of international environmental regimes by
Principle 21 of the 1972 UNCHE, which outlines that “states have…the sovereign right
to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies.” In addition
to the establishment of state sovereignty, however, this principle also imparts onto states
“the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause
damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction” (UN General Assembly1973, 5).
Effective regimes must remain respectful of state sovereignty in order to gain
support from states. However, in order to achieve their goals of combatting
environmental degradation, they must create certain restrictions. This principle from one
of the earliest instances of international environmental governance outlines the tension of
creating environmental governance that respects the sovereignty of states to operate
freely on their own land without causing negative effects on other states.
The scientific complexity of environmental issues presents a third barrier to
effective climate governance. Environmental degradation, from climate change to ozone
depletion, are multifaceted in nature and complex to solve. Policymakers, thus, must be
in communication with scientific experts in order to integrate environmental
consciousness into their policy solutions. Furthermore, the novelty of anthropogenic
environmental change leaves significant uncertainty about how to best mitigate or reverse
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its effects (Downie 2015). This overall scientific complexity presents additional
challenge.
A final challenge faced in crafting international environmental regimes is the
overlap of environmental issues with other issue areas of global governance, in particular
security and economic concerns. The protection of state security plays a central role in
any state actor’s evaluation of the international system. Traditional security threats, such
as military capability and conquest, therefore, are considered issues of high politics,
while environmental issues tend to remain lower on national and international political
agendas (Axelrod and VanDeveer 2019, 12). This general distinction of the environment
as a lesser political issue, however, is not reflective of the reality of environmental
degradation around the world.
The changing nature of the environment poses a serious security threat to many
states. Some nations face dangerous air or water quality levels that put individuals at risk,
while others face the loss of coastline to rising sea levels. Despite these clear threats to
human and state security emerging, many environmental institutions and regimes still
“lack adequate funding” or “effective enforcement mechanisms” (Axelrod and
VanDeveer 2019, 2). Instead of funneling resources into the mitigation of climate threats,
states have largely elected to dedicating their efforts to combatting more traditional
security threats. This clear relegation of environmental issues to an inferior status has led
to a wide failure of states to act decisively in response to potentially dangerous climate
changes (Axelrod and VanDeveer 2019).
Furthermore, there is complicated interplay of climate governance with economic
trade governance. Some scholars argue that the mobilization of a free marketplace
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through international trade regimes emphasizes the creation of “new technologies and the
significance of the international environmental regulatory context,” thus establishing a
more conducive setting for environmental regimes to operate in (Eckersley 2009, 15).
However, others abide by the notion that the two areas are opposed. They argue that
environmental regimes present additional regulations to states and other non-state actors,
which lead to incentive for defection in the name of economic free trade (Levy and
Prakash 2003).
One particular example of this potential contention is in distributional
responsibilities. While trade regimes advocate for the “principles of non-discrimination
and reciprocity,” environmental regimes tend to abide by the “common but differentiated
responsibilities” (Eckersley 2009, 13-14). As seen in the “relocation of emissionsintensive industry to developing countries,” economic actors have utilized the free trade
policies of the WTO to circumvent emissions regulations imposed by the Kyoto Protocol
(Eckersley 2009, 15). These types of discursive conflicts between trade and climate
regimes, thus, can lead to serious consequences for the state of the climate. 3
As illustrated in this previous section, the complex nature of environmental
issues, the tension between international environmental governance and state sovereignty,
and the interplay of environment governance with security and economic governance
have the potential to present challenges to the creation of effective and widely supported
international environmental regimes. This understanding will help to inform the
difficulties in studying environmental regimes described in the next section.

3

Although not discussed in detail here, the next section will consider how multinational corporations,
having considerable material capacity in the international arena, have become essential actors in the
international environmental regime development process.
14

II.

Regime Effectiveness
To inform the future direction of global governance, many contemporary scholars

of international regime theory aim to understand the factors that contribute to a functional
and impactful regime. Similar to how sustained periods of observable regime impact can
only emerge from a fully developed regime, the regime theory’s current focus on regime
impact has been a progression from a scholarship that originally focused on the regime
development process. This process begins with the regime formation and regime
implementation phases, followed by the regime impact on the issue area.
The distinction in these three phases of regime development is clarified in Figure
1.1 in the introduction to the book Environmental Regime Effectiveness (Underdal et al.
2002, 5-7). The first step in this regime process is behavioral output, or the formation of
“the norms, principles, and rules constituting the regime itself” by involved actors.
Following this output phase, there is the regime outcome, or the implementation of
regime measures by involved actors. Finally, these behaviors lead to an impact on the
target issue area. These three distinctive phases of output, outcome, and impact have
informed the structure of regime theory scholarship for decades. The next section briefly
discusses the first two phases of the regime development process before deeply exploring
the literature of regime effectiveness.

A. Regime Formation
The early years of regime theory scholarship focused on the outcome of
cooperative state behaviors, or on the regime formation process. The post-1945 era has
seen unprecedented amounts of institution-building that has sparked the development of a
literature on regimes. Operating within a realist-dominated international relations
15

discipline, however, scholars have been challenged to reconsider their understanding of
the international system by developing alternative theoretical explanations for why
international regimes were being created. With this new outlook on global political
institutions, early regime theory scholarship asked questions such as why certain
problems make the international system converge, how these issues make it to an
international agenda, which states become involved in the regime formation process, and
what bargaining processes look like (Breitmeier et al. 2006, 6; Young et al. 1995).
These informed discussions make clearer the conditions and factors that lead to
the formation of regimes. The scholarship suggests that actors within the international
system are more likely to formulate international regimes when there are lower costs of
regulation and negotiation, when there is a high level of public concern, when there is
scientific certainty around the issue, when there is support from important global actors,
and when there is symmetry in power between the participants (DeVos et al. 2013, 110111). Understanding these types of insights regarding the formation of regimes is a first
step towards the creation of more impactful future institutions. “Still, a concentration on
processes of regime formation,” Breitmeier and his colleagues explain, “is obviously
insufficient to produce a convincing case for the allocation of time and energy to the
development of regime theory” (2006, 6). To better determine if and when regimes are a
worthwhile use of resources for global actors, scholars have progressed into the
implementation and effectiveness phases of the regime development process.

B. Regime Implementation
In uniting to form the principles, norms, rules, or decision-making procedures that
constitute an international regime, global actors acknowledge the need for coordinated
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change in the international arena. Even with legal commitment, however, change will not
take place unless these actors follow through on their agreed-upon obligations (Victor et
al. 1998). Therefore, the scholarship concerned with regime success and failure has
moved past studying the regime output, or the regime formation phase, and looked to the
regime outcome, or the regime implementation phase (Underdal et al. 2002, 5-7). These
scholars are largely concerned with the conversion of regime “commitments into action”
(Victor et al. 1998, back cover).
In operationalizing the degree of regime implementation, scholars often use
measures of “goal attainment, compliance, behavioral change, social learning and the
initiation of social practices” (Kütting 2000, 32). These types of indicators, when taken
together, paint a well-rounded picture of how well the formation of the regime has
changed the behaviors of participants toward the achievement of regime goals. In other
words, an analysis of regime implementation measures how successfully the regime
serves its role as a behavior-altering institution. 4
Victor and his colleagues in their 1998 book on environmental regime
implementation helpfully break down this investigative process into two separate levels
of analysis. Firstly, they look at the global “institutions through which the parties share
information, compare activities, review performance, handle noncompliance, and adjust
commitments” (Victor et al.1998, 3). These mechanisms operate at the international level
to hold actors accountable for their obligations. Moving beyond this international level of
analysis, however, the authors focus on national implementation. The scholars concede

4

Serving as a behavior-altering institution does not necessarily indicate an effective regime outcome.
Rather, a properly formed and well-implemented regime still may see an underwhelming impact on the
issue area. This will be further discussed in the forthcoming section.
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that there is no single pattern for domestic implementation practice. Rather, it depends on
the participation and dedication of governmental bodies, corporate actors, environmental
groups, and experts (Victor et al.1998). These international and national levels of regime
implementation are pulled together by scholars to form a larger measure of how well the
commitments to the institution are being fulfilled.

C. Regime Effectiveness: Institutional
Similar to how regime formation does not guarantee the implementation of its
commitments, an implemented regime does not promise positive environmental change
(DeVos et al. 2013). Therefore, to gauge how well the international community is
handing the ecological problems at hand, a number of scholars have looked past the
output and outcome phases of regime development to the impact, or effectiveness phase.
Regime effectiveness, in its basic form, can be defined as “the extent to which
regimes contribute to solving or mitigating the problems that motivate those who create
them” (Young 2014, 275). This critical assessment gauges how impactful these
institutions are in dealing with their issue area (Young and Levy 1999; Andresen and Hey
2005). In an ideal world, regime effectiveness would measure how the presence of the
regime changed its goal-related outcomes (Breitmeier 2013, 162; Young 2014, 275).
However, this type of evaluation would involve comparing the resulting post-regime
reality to a nonexistent non-regime reality (Breitmeier 2013; Young 2014). The lack of a
genuine counterfactual for comparison, therefore, makes establishing causality between a
regime’s presence and an outcome challenging in most cases, if not impossible. Without
a way to directly measure regime effectiveness, scholars within the field have debated the
appropriateness of substitute measures for much of the past three decades.
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The mechanisms for measuring effectiveness take a variety of forms, from goal
achievement analysis to behavioral change monitoring. Instead of simply listing them,
this next section will organize the commonly employed methods for measuring
environmental regime effectiveness into five categories: problem-solving, legal,
economic, normative, and political 5. While there exists overlap between the categories,
this classification provides a helpful synthesis of the approaches to defining and
measuring regime effectiveness.
Some scholars of international environmental regimes still adopt a problemsolving approach that measures “the degree to which a regime eliminates or alleviates the
problem that prompts its creation” (Young and Levy 1999, 4). By looking at the postregime reality, scholars make judgements on how well or how poorly a regime performed
in achieving desired solutions. As discussed above, however, there is difficulty in
establishing a relationship between the presence of environmental regimes and changes to
the environmental condition. With a range of actors and factors that are constantly
contributing to the status of the environment, “it is perfectly possible, in most cases, that
goal attainment is attributable to factors other than the existence and operation of the
regimes themselves” (Breitmeier et al. 2006, 130). Without the ability to establish
causality, many scholars have looked for more concretely grounded measurements. These
include the legal, economic, normative, and political approaches.
The legal approach to defining regime effectiveness avoids this causality
complication by assessing the outcome of the regime by “the degree to which contractual

5

These five categories have been taken from Young and Levy’s effectiveness classifications from their
1999 piece on international environmental regime effectiveness.
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obligations are met—rules are complied with, policies changed, programs initiated”
(Young and Levy 1999, 4). A well-designed regime will feature rules and programs that
properly address the problem at hand. In this case, the degree to which actors comply
with these regulations serves as a substitute for how well a problem is managed.
While measures of legal compliance may be used for evaluating actors’ responses
to regime formation, it is worth noting that Breitmeier, Young, and Zürn conclude in their
2006 book that a strictly enforced approach to regime compliance, such as legal binding
contract, actually results in less effective environmental regimes. Rather, they argue that
a consensual management approach to compliance was more likely to lead to the
fulfillment of regime goals.
The legal approach has been expanded into the economic approach, which looks
at how efficient actors are in their pursuit of regime success. Between two regimes with
identical compliance outcomes, the institution that imposes the least cost, whether related
to startup or compliance, will be deemed more effective than the one with higher costs
(Young and Levy 1999, 5). This approach is less telling of the problem-solving capacity
of the regime. However, it may be incorporated by scholars into a larger measurement of
regime effectiveness in order to assess how well the regime is functioning as an
institution (Breitmeier 2013, 166-7).
The normative approach, while typically not used in and of itself, can be added
onto other measurements of effectiveness to gauge the regime’s participation, fairness,
and justice (Young and Levy 1999, 5). On a base level, a regime with a wide range of
participants will see the reinforcement of norms and institutions that are necessary for
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regime success. Some scholars argue, however, that a just distribution of responsibility
between these participants needs consideration.
Although concrete notions of fairness and justice may be difficult to apply across
international borders, environmental regime formation has accounted for actors’ relative
contributions to environmental issues. The creation of a “just” environmental regime,
thus, hinges on its ability to “include provisions which differentiate commitments or
rights among industrialized and developing countries” (Stone 2004). 6
Andresen and Hey also describe this phenomenon in their 2005 piece on
environmental regime effectiveness and legitimacy. While the path to an effective
environmental regime depends on both developed and developing states, the scholars
argue that it is for different reasons. For developed states, who have contributed
significantly to the degradation of the environment, regime effectiveness hinges on their
willingness to invest financial and informational resources into policy creation and
implementation. Developing states, who are navigating through what has been a
historically detrimental development process, must also actively invest in the efforts to
protect the environment (Andresen and Hey 2005). This differentiation between the role
of developed and developing states demonstrates some of the benefits of using a justiceinformed normative approach to regime effectiveness. While a normative approach to
regime effectiveness may not fully account for the ability of a regime to change
environmental outcomes, it does measures level of participation in the regime creation
6

One example of this “differentiation of commitments” can be seen in Article 3 Principle 1 of the 1992
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). This article states that “the Parties
should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the
basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective
capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change
and the adverse effects thereof” (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 1992).
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and implementation process and the distribution of responsibility for solving climate
issues among participants.
Finally, Young and Levy describe the fifth, or political approach, to regime
effectiveness. Based on the supposition that solutions to transboundary international
environmental problems require the cooperation of many states, many regime theorists
operate under the notion that functioning regimes are a precursor to solving
environmental crises (DeVos et al. 2013, 102; Underdal 2002, 6; Young and Levy 1999).
While a successful regime still may not fully resolve its issue area, they argue that no
solution is even possible without one. Therefore, scholars of international environmental
regimes employing this political approach conceptualize regimes as political institutions
that cause changes “in the behavior of actors, in the interests of actors, or in the policies
and performance of institutions in ways that contribute to positive management of the
targeted problem” (Young and Levy 1999, 5). These institutions change behaviors, and
thus, may lead to improvements on the environmental issue at hand.
This political approach, although similar, is distinct from the legal approach.
While the legal approach uses an actor’s compliance with contractual or noncontractual
regime obligations to measure the regime’s effectiveness, some scholars argues that this
is not enough to capture the alignment of regime goals with an actor’s interests. A
regime, Breitmeier explains, can be considered an effective political body if the
“compliance behaviour is caused by factors which are independent of the power and
interests responsible for their initial creation” (Breitmeier 2013, 166). Therefore, rather
than strictly looking at compliance, a behavioral change measurement assesses the ability
of the regime to exercise power over actors. This analysis of how a regime can exercise
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power over international actors is informed by the common practice of investigating
power dynamics within international relations scholarship.
With these five approaches to employ, the regime effectiveness concept rarely
abides by a singular approach. Breitmeier, Young, and Zürn, for example, define
effectiveness as “the attainment of goals and progress toward solving the problems
leading to their creation,” using a combination of the problem-solving, legal, and political
approaches (2006, 114). Wettestad and Andresen combine the political approach with
regime design, as they measure “goal achievement of the agreement…and how far
agreement content is equal to expert advice on what measures should be taken” (1991, 2,
qtd. in Kütting 2000, 32). Rather than employing these measures in isolation, these five
approaches are taken in conjunction by scholars to capture the wider breadth of the
concept of regime effectiveness.

While the latter four of these five approaches are employed as measures of regime
effectiveness, they are issues in using them as full substitutes for the solution attainment
evaluation of the first problem-solving approach. Instead of evaluating the progress on
the solution of transboundary environmental problems that caused the formation of the
regime, the legal, economic, normative, and political approaches use behavioral change
and regime goal attainment to infer how impactful it will be. These types of
measurements are more indicative of how functional the regime is from a formation or
implementation standpoint and less of how effective the regime is.
This problem in using implementation measurements for effectiveness is wellarticulated by Werksman and his colleagues, who counter many traditional scholars when
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they argue that “greater compliance is neither a sufficient nor necessary condition for
effectiveness” (1996, 25). A regime that is unambitious in design may see high levels of
compliance from participants but insufficient changes in regime impact on environmental
improvement. Further, an actor’s behavioral change may not be in full compliance with a
regime with ambitious goals but may still be contributing to the solution of an
environmental issue (Werksman et al. 1996, 25). As neither a necessary nor sufficient
substitute for regime effectiveness, measurements of compliance and behavioral change
are argued to be inadequate for accounting for regime effectiveness. Therefore, they
argue that these substitute evaluations of regime formation, design, and implementation
should be used with caution in scholarship about regime effectiveness.

D. Regime Effectiveness: Ecological
Because of the challenges presented by a problem-solving approach, international
regime scholars have employed substitute measures of effectiveness, such as legal
compliance and behavioral change. Many recent scholars, however, have rededicated
themselves to using problem-solving measures to gauge regime effectiveness. In general,
they argue that if environmental regimes have been created for the purpose of defending
ecological values and if effectiveness is a measure of how well the regime achieved this
purpose, there needs to be a greater effort by environmental regime scholars to deploy
direct measurements of environmental problem solving (Kütting 2000; Underdal 2002;
Jackson and Bührs 2015). This effort to assess the biophysical world, they argue, can be
done through the adoption of ecological indicators into measures of regime effectiveness.
In distinguishing between commonly employed strategies of studying effectiveness with
this new ecologically minded approach, scholars describe the evaluation of regime
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functioning as institutional effectiveness and the evaluation of the resulting environment
as ecological effectiveness.
As explained earlier, using strictly institutional measures is helpful when
assessing regime formation or regime implementation. These institutional measures
capture the “consequences in the form of changes in human behavior” or regime
outcomes (Underdal 2002, 6). These types of measures, however, cannot completely
capture how much of an improvement the issues are seeing. Underdal argues for the
measurement of regime impact, or the “consequences that materialize as changes in the
state of the biophysical environment itself” (Underdal 2002, 6). These measures of
regime impact, while difficult to employ, are necessary for the proper evaluation of the
whole regime development process.
Kütting similarly critiques the use of strictly institutional measures of regime
outcome. “If the paramount aim of an…agreement is to deal effectively with a specific
environmental problem,” she argues, “it is clear that neither the mere existence of an
agreement nor possible high participation nor ultimate compliance should merit undue
celebration without the crucial test of the adequacy of the international environmental
agreement to deal with the specific problem nominally addressed” (Kütting 2000, 2-3).
She argues that IR regime scholars have made too central the interactions of international
actors without proper consideration for the outcomes of these interactions.
To remedy this tendency of IR scholars to hyper-focus on anthropocentric factors
of “institutional” regime effectiveness, there is a need for the “re-embedding” of the
interactions of international actors into its natural or environmental context. Through an
evaluation of the economic, temporal, scientific, and regulatory structures at play in the
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Mediterranean Action Plan (MAP) and the Convention on Long-Range Trans-boundary
Air Pollution (CLRTAP), Kütting demonstrates how an institutional approach to
effectiveness cannot both capture the outcomes and impact of regimes. While she does
not present her own cohesive measure of environmental effectiveness, Kütting implores
future scholars of environmental regime effectiveness to take “account of social, political,
economic, scientific, technological, bureaucratic and temporal structures and factors”
(Kütting 2000, 7). This “holistic approach,” she argues, will be more conducive to the
informing the future of international environmental regimes.
Wendy Jackson and Ton Bührs also acknowledge this methodological downfall
within the existing environmental regime literature. “Behaviour change is an essential
element of effectiveness and should also be part of any definition and evaluation,” they
acknowledge. “However, these evaluations are only half the task—the other half is
examining if behavioural outcomes have resulted in any ecological impacts” (Jackson
and Bührs 2015, 72). Like Underdal and Kütting, they argue that the inclusion of
ecological factors into definitions of effectiveness is imperative to fully understanding the
situational outcome. To achieve this, they suggest that IR scholars integrate cross-level
and cross-temporal tactics used by conservation biologists to refine their conservation
practices (Jackson and Bührs 2015, 81). However, recognizing that the establishment of
causality is challenging, if not impossible, because of the variety of factors that play into
ecological change, they believe scholars should aim for establishing “plausible
correlation and explanations” rather than causality (Jackson and Bührs 2015, 77).
As demonstrated by the growing critique of strictly using institutional measures of
effectiveness, there is a need for the employment of ecological effectiveness. While there
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are a number of challenges to overcome in order to properly rededicate the scholarship to
studying regime impact, it is a necessary progression. Another discussion of this topic
can be found in the theoretical argument and methodology sections.

III. Non-State Actors and the Environment
Conventional regime theory scholarship has placed state actors at the center of its
analysis (Levy and Prakash 2003, 131). This tendency to narrowly investigate state
behavior is reflective of many traditional theoretical approaches to international relations,
such as realist and liberal thinking. However, this focus has largely overlooked the
complexities imposed by non-state actors, such as international governmental
organizations, non-governmental organizations, and multinational corporations (Levy and
Newell 2005). This section explores how non-state actors, in their respective ways, can
have significant impacts on the international environmental governance system.

A. IGOs and Environmental Governance
With states as members, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) are larger
governing bodies formed for the purpose of facilitating action on transboundary issues.
While states have the sovereignty to make autonomous decisions outside of the realm of
an IGO, states may voluntarily agree to invest their time and resources into participating
in the work of IGOs. This is because they are stakeholders in a host of international
issues and because they have faith in the capabilities of IGOs in promoting cooperation
and drafting solutions to complex issues (O’Neill 2019).
IGOs have formally been defined as “organizations that include at least three
states as members, that have activities in several states, and that are created through a
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formal intergovernmental agreement such as a treaty, charter, or statute” (Karns et al.
2015, 12). These formal institutions operate across borders internationally on a host of
issues, from global trade to economic development to human rights. As of 2014, about
265 different IGOs were in operation throughout the international system (Karns et al.
2015).
Despite their widespread use to solve a variety of issues, much of the work of
IGOs within the environmental realm has been completed by the United Nations System.
Since the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm and the
inception of the UNEP, the UN member states have seen coordinated efforts to reduce
carbon emissions, promote sustainable development, and create international
environmental law (O’Neill 2019).
Because of the voluntary nature of joining an IGO, these institutions face challenges,
such as lack of authority, difficulty in coordinating efforts, and inconsistent funding.
While this has caused setbacks in the creation of groundbreaking solutions to
environmental concerns, the secretariats and state diplomats and working in conjunction
with scientific subsidiary bodies have produced sustained, impressive efforts (O’Neill
2019).

B. NGOs and Environmental Governance
While IGOs can be seen as extensions of state power, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) are often seen as extensions of civil society. As a range of
environmental problems have become increasingly important to members of the general
public, members of society, whether individuals or organizations, have increasingly
organized into coalitions of NGOs (O’Neill 2019). As entirely separate entities from
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states with no direct decision-making capabilities, NGOs have entered environmental
debated through nontraditional means.
These organizations aim to tackle a host of environmental topics through their
influence over law and policy. During the agenda setting and negation stages, NGOs may
lobby directly or partner with corporate actors to influence the decisions of policymakers.
Information spreading tactics and public mobilization may also put pressure on state
diplomats to be environmentally conscious in policy decisions (Burgiel and Wood, 2012).
In the implementation stage, NGOs work to sustain the regime momentum by generating
new information for public dissemination and monitoring the resulting actions of states
and corporations. Beyond this, NGOs often work in transnational advocacy networks to
exert pressure on international state actors (O’Neill 2019).
These NGO strategies have been increasingly impactful on global environmental
governance since the 1990s. While their relative lack of monetary resources gives them a
disadvantage to MNCs, these tactics caused the “dyadic bargaining between states and
MNCs [to] develop into multiparty bargaining among NGOs, governments and firms”
(Levy and Prakash 2003, 141). The collective voice of civil society has resulted in the
growing prominence of environmental NGOs and the incorporation of NGO demands in
bargaining agendas. Although this project is not focused on the implications of NGOs on
climate governance, they are playing an increasingly vital role in the development of
environmental regimes.

C. MNCs and Environmental Governance
The study of IGOs and NGOs in relation to environmental political realms is
helpful in understanding how the international community attempts to deal with the
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negative effects of environmental degradation. An analysis of the role of multinational
corporations (MNCs) can also contribute to this discussion. Before delving into the role
of MNCs in the creation of international environmental policy, however, it is helpful to
trace the origins of environmental degradation to trends of globalization and harmful
business practices.
The growth of global economic activity has demonstrated impacts on the
environment. As globalization has flourished, particularly over the past half century,
industrialized business practices have degraded ecological integrity. Mittelmann explains
that the “large scale growth in world economic output...has not only quickened the
breakdown of the global resource base, but also has upset the planet’s regenerative
system” (1998, 847). The decreasing cost and increasing accessibility of production and
transportation practices have caused intensive growth in the amounts of waste and
pollution contaminating air, land, and water sources around the world (Newell 1999). The
export-led agricultural market has caused an increase in the use of “damaging pesticides”
and “endangered local food security” (Newell 1999, 2). These few examples represent a
small sample of the business practices that have simultaneously brought economic
prosperity to many humans and harmful changes to the ecology of the earth.
This corporate force described above that give MNCs the power to destroy,
however, also give them the ability to forge meaningful change. Newell (1999) sums up
the impressive prowess of multinational corporations in the realm of international
environmental regimes.
With annual turnovers that dwarf the GDPs of most Least Developed
Countries, and the ability to make investments with enormous natural
resource implications, as well as control of the technology and capital that
is likely to be the vehicle for the implementation of many international
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environmental agreements, companies are central agents in the
environmental debate (Newell 1999, 4).
This base understanding of the relationship between corporate action and environmental
decay has informed the development of a new body of literature regarding the role of
multinational corporations (MNCs) in international regimes.

With MNCs being actors of considerable importance in the realm of climate
governance, many scholars have sought to define exactly how they interact and engage,
directly or indirectly, in environmental diplomacy. Falkner breaks these actions and
influences in environmental diplomacy into four categories (2008, 8-10). First, MNCs
engage in lobbying through both financial means and the generation and spread of
information (Kolk and Pinkse 2007). From having a “formal voice in advisory panels” to
“authoring and reviewing scientific reports,” the voice of international business is strong
in the ears of politicians (Levy and Newell 2005, 4). Secondly, during the regime
implementation phase, MNCs may engage in the regulation of business practices or the
innovation of new technologies to comply with regime policies. They may alternately
decide to defect through the process of “regulatory capture” to weaken the national
implementation of environmental regulation (Falkner 2008, 9). Either way, corporate
actors are critical in the implementation and technological innovation of the regime.
Next, Falkner highlights MNCs’ ability to shape public discourses around
environmental issues. With influence over consumer bases, MNCs may “inject a more
business-friendly perspective on regulatory politics” that garners wider support for
deregulation (Falkner 2008, 10). These public perspectives will, in turn, impact the
agenda of politicians. Finally, MNCs engage in their own private norm and rule-setting.
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Some businesses actors, succumbing to pressure from activist or consumer groups,
establish their own corporate rules for environmentally sustainable practices (Falkner
2008, 10; Kolk and Pinkse 2007). Although not widespread, this strategy of “selfregulation” is becoming more common with mounting pressure from civil society actors.
This sampling of strategies explains how the profit-seeking tendencies of MNCs are able
to influence the development of international environmental regimes.
While much of early regime theory took a state-centric approach to regime
analysis, contemporary scholars have made an effort to account for the nuances imposed
by business actors on regime development. Some regime theory scholars, therefore, have
incorporated elements of international business and international political economy (IPE)
literature (Levy and Prakash 2003; Vormedal 2010). By considering more seriously the
pressures of the global economy concerns, scholars of this IPE-informed regime theory
consider economic capital as a driver in political decision making. Hence, capital-driven,
profit-seeking entities like MNCs can become powerful actors in the international system
by directly influencing the decisions of state actors (Betsill 2006).
While some scholars aim to capture the influential nature of capital itself through
the mere incorporation of IPE ideas, others prefer to describe the relationship between the
state and corporate elites further. Seeing an inability for traditional realist or liberal
theory to account for the influence of corporate actors in policy, transnational historic
materialism (THM), a theoretical offshoot of the Gramscian tradition, has emerged (Palan
and Overbeek 2012, 162). THM argues that a global political order is established by “a
transnational historic bloc, comprising a coalition of businesses intellectuals and state
managers that transcends any one class and is bound together through common identities
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and interests by material and ideological structures” (Levy and Egan 2000, 139). When
applied to international environmental regimes, the focus that THM has placed on the
economic, social, and political influence of the transnational historic bloc allows for a
wider analysis of the “relationship between regimes and broader relations of power” in
the international system (Levy and Newell 2005, 86). This type of inquiry has thus
balanced the importance of state actors in regime formation processes with other nonstate actors and social factors.
Some regime scholars who are concerned with MNCs have fully integrated the
corporate and social considerations of THM into their research. Others argue that the
application of this Gramscian framework to international regime scholarship puts far too
much weight on non-state actors during the development of global governance structures
(Levy and Prakash 2003). Despite the argument over the source and strength of corporate
influence, these scholars do agree that MNCs belong alongside states in scholarly
discussion of regime development. Therefore, IPE-informed regime scholarship
continues to seek insight on why and how MNCs involve themselves the development of
international environmental regimes.

To acquire a full understanding of the corporate impact on international
environmental regimes, we begin with a general description of the relationship of
corporations to international regimes. Many international regimes through the enacting of
rules, norms, and policies have an effect on the economic marketplace. Describing this
phenomenon, Levy and Egan explain international regimes as exhibiting market-enabling
or regulatory qualities. Market-enabling regimes, in general, offer “the infrastructure of a
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neo-liberal world trade and investment regime and in which multinational capital is
highly influential and supportive” (Levy and Egan 2000, 139). These regimes, through
the propagation of the neoliberal principle of a fair but competitive marketplace, facilitate
business practices and relations. In a later piece, Levy and Prakash further explain that
“MNCs tend to support the creation of market enabling regimes at the international level”
(2003, 147). These regimes cultivate an equally competitive global marketplace that
benefits businesses.
Regulatory regimes, on the other hand, create barriers to business relations
through the enacting of governing parameters for “negotiating and promulgating social,
labour and environmental policies” (Levy and Egan 2000, 139). These rules, particularly
when enacted at an international level, garner opposition from business actors (Levy and
Prakash 2003, 147).
International environmental regimes, through the enactment of ecological rules,
norms, and policies, are commonly classified as regulatory. Much of the early scholarship
within the subfield, thus, abides by this notion that MNCs are resistant to global
regulatory environmental governance during the regime formation and implementation
stages. With widespread industrial business practices being a primary driver of
environmental degradation (Mittelman 1998; Newell 1999), the introduction of a host of
international environmental regimes brought MNCs increasingly restrictive conditions
under which they had to operate. Due to these additional barriers, throughout the 1960s
and 1970s “corporate involvement in international environmental politics was limited to
occasional, and largely reactive, interventions to prevent burdensome regulations”
(Falkner 2008, 4). Business, when faced with environmental regulation, had, and
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continues to have, incentives to defect. Thus, the interaction between environmental
regimes and MNCs was explained as oppositional and uncooperative.

While the literature suggests that corporations are generally opposed to
environmental regulation, contemporary scholarship on corporate strategy has begun to
look for circumstances where this does not hold true. Falkner argues that environmental
regulation may offer corporations, for example, the opportunity to “reduce pollution
while simultaneously reducing fuel and material expenses and the costs of waste disposal,
insurance, legal fees, and liability” (2008, 92). These types of process improvements may
provide economic incentives for firms to support regulatory policy. Additionally, he
investigates the importance of a corporation’s public image in its choice of environmental
policy. He suggests that the advancement of environmental protection as a social value
and the emergence of corporate social responsibility as a driving factor in corporate
strategy has caused “a growing number of corporations [have begun] to integrate
environmental objectives into their business operations…and develop more progressive
political strategies” (Falkner 2008, 4). The positive public image that comes with
environmental protection, thus, may drive corporations to pursue more regulatory
strategies.
Analyses of a corporation’s position in the wider marketplace also reveals an
insightful interpretation of the subfield. Levy and Prakash suggest that companies may
gain an advantage over competitors if they have “lower compliance costs” or are “better
situated to innovate” in the face of environmental regulation (Levy and Prakash 2003,
137). Kennard further endorses this idea in her 2020 analysis of large oil firms’ responses
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to air pollution regulation. She concludes that certain firms may choose to support the
enactment of regulatory climate policy when those policies impose higher costs on their
competition (Kennard 2020). Climate regulation can, under certain circumstances,
become a strategic way to gain competitive advantage to other firms. There is growing
consensus that “MNCs pay close attention not to regulation per se, but rather to the
regulatory costs they bear in relation to their market competitors” (Levy and Prakash
2003, 136).
Vormedal develops an alternative framework to explain the general stance of
business actors facing environmental regulation. He argues that, in the life cycle of
environmental regimes, there is a ‘tipping point’ after which business strategies shift
“from opposition to support for international regulation through regimes” (2010, 252).
This tipping point can be explained by the socialization of norms and the integration of
these ideas into acceptable business practices. Although from a strictly material
perspective, corporations may be at odds with environmental regulation, these scholars
have demonstrated how discussions of corporate strategy in a dynamic social world can
provide a more nuanced interpretation of the business relationship to regulatory
environmental regimes.
These types of nuances in the interactions of MNCs and environmental regimes
has led scholars to tweak the strict definition of a regime as market-enabling or
regulatory. While classifying a regime as either market-enabling or regulatory is
attractively simple, many acknowledge that regimes do not fit squarely into one category.
Rather, “many regimes have a complex, hybrid nature, which requires decomposition for
the sake of analysis” (Levy and Prakash 2003, 135). Addressing environmental regimes
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specifically, Young concurs with this conclusion when he argues that “a sizeable
proportion of the success of environmental regimes is attributable to activities that are not
regulatory in the ordinary sense” (Young 2014, 279). These scholars contend that each
regime, regardless of its issue area, features its own combination of market-enabling and
regulatory characteristics that merit deeper analysis.
To complete this regime-by-regime analysis of its relationship to the market,
Young suggests looking specifically at the practices and implications of the regime. For
environmental regimes, this includes a deeper dive into the programmatic activities,
knowledge generation and dissemination tactics, and generation of new markets for
technologies (Young 2014). He suggests that this analysis will reveal some international
environmental regimes to be less reliant on market regulatory activities and lean toward a
market-enabling categorization. With this analysis, one can better understand the nature
of an environmental regime as more market-enabling or regulatory.

IV. Theoretical Argument
The literature provides a good base for investigating the impact of multinational
corporations on international environmental regime effectiveness. It is clear that non-state
actors, such as MNCs, are playing an increasingly important role in the development of
international environmental regimes. By looking to the implications of environmental
regimes on the market, we can define these regimes according to Levy and Egan’s
classification of regimes as market-enabling or regulatory. Then, we may generalize the
tendencies of MNCs to support or oppose the regime (Levy and Egan 2000; Levy and
Prakash 2003). With the support or opposition of powerful multinational corporations, I
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offer two hypotheses regarding the resulting effectiveness of international environmental
regimes.

A. Hypothesis One
When an international environmental regime is market-enabling, it will be more
institutionally effectively than one that is regulatory.
If evaluating regime effectiveness through institutional indicators such as
behavioral change, compliance, and goal attainment, I expect to see higher levels of
effectiveness from regimes that are enabling rather than regulatory. In general,
multinational corporations tend to support market-enabling regimes over regulatory
regimes. Thus, when a regime’s provisions are conducive to corporate interest or action,
the involved MNCs will be more willing to exercise their economic power, resources,
and efforts to abide by regime standards. These higher levels of actor compliance and
behavioral change will, thus, lead to a more institutionally effective regime. In a more
regulatory regime, on the other hand, the regime’s primary goal is to constrain the free
market economy. As a result, there would presumably be more pushback from the actors
involved during the regime formation and implementation process, creating a less
institutionally effective regime.

B. Hypothesis Two
When an international environmental regime is market-enabling, it will be less
effective ecologically than one that is regulatory.
While institutional support is essential for the implementation of a regime,
scholars have demonstrated the need for an environmentally informed approach to
determining the impact of international environmental regimes. By implementing
environmental, or impact-driven, indicators in a measure of ecological regime
38

effectiveness, I expect to see that market-enabling environmental regimes are less
ecologically effective than those that are regulatory. This expectation comes from the
notion that globalized corporate practices are environmentally damaging. A regime that
employs a market-enabling approach, as opposed to a regulatory approach, will be more
conducive to the continued use of these practices by corporate actors. This freedom to
continue operating in an unregulated marketplace will, thus, cause negative impacts on
the environment, as it has historically. A regulatory regime, on the other hand, will
impose harsher regulations or restrictions on state and firm behavior. While some state
and corporate actors will push back against these harsher regulations, I argue that the
positive behavioral changes brought about by these additional regulations will cause an
overall benefit in the level of observable ecological regime impact. The two hypotheses
are illustrated diagrammatically in the table below.
Table 2.1 Diagram of Hypotheses
Dependent: Level of institutional
regime effectiveness

+

Independent: Whether the
regime is market-enabling
-

Dependent: Level of ecological
regime effectiveness

C. Additional Comments and Expectations for Findings
In creating the arrow diagram, there was some uncertainty over the proper
treatment of institutional and ecological effectiveness in relation to one another. This
section explains reasoning for employing them as two separate independent variables.
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As discussed in the review of regime effectiveness literature, scholars commonly
argue that the solution to transnational environmental issues require the cooperation of a
host of state, corporate, and civil society actors (Young and Levy 1999; Underdal 2002,
6; DeVos et al. 2013, 102). The effective functioning of an environmental regime, thus, is
considered a precondition to the solution of problems. If this functioning of a regime can
be equated to its institutional effectiveness, and the resulting impact of the regime
equated to ecological effectiveness, then this argument from scholars suggests that a high
level of institutional effectiveness is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a high
resulting level of ecological effectiveness.
Broken down, this argument would have two parts. A regime that is defined as
institutionally effective may be either ecologically effective or ineffective. However, if a
regime is institutionally ineffective, it may only be ecologically ineffective.
This type of theoretical explanation, when applied to this project, would result in
a more linear argument like the arrow diagram illustrates. A regulatory regime could
result in a higher ecological effectiveness if, and only if, there was an increase in the
institutional effectiveness of the regime.
Table 2.2 Preliminary Arrow Diagram of Hypothesis
Independent:
Whether the regime
is market-enabling

+

Intervening: Level of
institutional regime
effectiveness

+

Dependent: Level of
ecological regime
effectiveness

While these types of effectiveness may move together in many cases, I expect to
see that differences in the regime’s treatment of the economic marketplace will cause
their decoupling. Thus, when the regime is considered regulatory, institutional
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effectiveness is not a precondition for ecological effectiveness. That is, a regulatory
regime can be simultaneously institutionally ineffective and ecologically effective.
The commonly used measures of institutional effectiveness, such as compliance,
behavioral change, and goal attainment do relate to regime impact, or in this case, the
ecological effectiveness of the regime. However, these institutional measures may be,
under certain conditions, neither “necessary nor sufficient condition[s] for effectiveness”
(Mitchell 1994, 25; Kütting 2000, 30). With this in mind, I argue that a regulatory regime
is one condition where institutional and ecological effectiveness are not linked.
Regulatory regimes, because of their goals of seriously altering the behaviors of
state and corporate actors, are innately ambitious. When these ambitious regime goals are
not fully met by participants, they may be considered institutionally ineffective.
However, in this case, the behavioral changes that do take place still may result in
positive environmental or ecological effects, rendering the regime ecologically effective.
This potential for the decoupling of institutional and ecological effectiveness is why these
concepts are employed as two separate independent variables in this study. While they
may move together in certain circumstances, it is possible that they will not when the
regime is strictly regulatory.

This study operates at the largely understudied overlap of environmental regime
effectiveness literature and corporate interest in environmental regulation. While there is
extensive literature building in each of these areas, a solid marriage of the two field
concepts has still not developed. This project is complex by nature but could serve as a
valuable base for the expansion of a market-informed regime analysis.
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If both of these hypotheses are supported by the research, it will have two main
implications on the future of environmental regimes. Firstly, supported hypotheses would
demonstrate the value of regulation to the creation of impactful environmental change.
There is a complicated relationship of corporate actors to environmental regime
regulations. While tough regulations may lead to push back from corporate and state
actors, confirmed hypotheses would show that the benefits from regulating more strictly
could outweigh the cost of noncompliance.
Additionally, if supported, however, the hypotheses would bring further evidence
against the use of strictly institutional measures for capturing the concept of
environmental regime effectiveness. The scholarship is currently relying on institutional
indicators of success. However, by demonstrating how the measures of institutional and
ecological effectiveness can be decoupled, this project could lead to additional
speculation on this academic practice.
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Chapter 3: Methodology
This third chapter begins by revisiting the study’s hypotheses regarding the relationship
of market-enabling or regulatory regime structure to environmental regime effectiveness.
The next section outlines the most similar comparative case study methodology which is
used assess the research question. The final section justifies the case selection and sets
forth a plan the operationalization of the variables, particularly an explanation of how to
properly code international environmental regimes as regulatory or market-enabling and
assess their effectiveness, both institutionally and ecologically.

I.

Hypotheses
The hypothesis states that that market-enabling environmental regimes will be

more institutionally effective than regimes that strictly regulate the marketplace.
Simultaneously, market-enabling regimes are expected to be less ecologically effective
than those that are regulatory in nature. These two hypotheses are illustrated in the table
below.
Table 3.1 Table of Hypotheses Relationship
Type of Effectiveness
Institutional
Ecological
Effectiveness Effectiveness
+
—

Regime
Type

Market-Enabling

II.

Strictly Regulatory

—

+

Methodology
In order to carry out a comprehensive analysis of the impact of enabling the

marketplace in international environmental regimes on their effectiveness, this project
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employs a comparative case study methodology. An in-depth qualitative examination of
two or more particular instances of a phenomenon, the comparative case study is an
appropriate way to begin investigating the relatively small population of international
environmental regimes (Howard 2017).
The comparative case study method to be deployed is Mill’s Method of
Difference, which is named for its treatment of the study-variables, or variables of
interest (Mill 1869). Researchers select cases with different values on the independent
variables, similar case characteristics, and different values on the dependent variables
(Van Evera 1997, 57). By “comparing multiple cases that have been selected to be as
similar as possible on as many variables as possible,” one can “logically preclude these
variables as possible causes” (Powner 2015, 124). In other words, when there is a
difference in the outcome of interest and the other case characteristics are controlled for,
one can eliminate many potential causes eliminated and may begin to see a relationship
emerge between the variables of interest. This project investigates four cases, two
market-enabling regimes and two regulatory regimes, whose comparison will allow for
the analysis of both of the hypotheses.
While there are drawbacks to any non-experimental design, Mill’s two methods
are generally seen as weaker options for comparative case methodology within the social
sciences because their reliance on case selection often compromises the validity of the
research. Nonetheless, a comparative case study methodology has the potential of
maintaining high levels of internal validity, or the demonstration of a relationship (or lack
thereof) between the independent and dependent variables. Within Mill’s Method of
Difference, the selection of cases with similar values of control variables allows the
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relationship of interest to emerge. However, because political phenomena cannot be
experimentally altered to control for confounding variables, it can be difficult to find a
sample cases that will allow for the proper and logical application of the method (Van
Evera 1997, 58; Powner 2015, 125). The selection of these most similar cases, while
unlikely to be perfect, will be absolutely essential for guaranteeing higher levels of
internal validity in the study.
Comparative case study methods, like the Method of Difference, can also have
high external validity, or applicability to a non-study context. This is because the sample
of cases that a researcher selects within an observational research design comes from
directly from the wider population of cases. By becoming familiar with nuances of the
relevant cases, researchers employing a comparative case study can understand their
workings of their samples and make well-informed conclusions. Small-n comparative
case studies, however, do face a breach in external validity (Powner 2015, 125). Because
this method uses a much smaller selection of cases to explore a larger population, there
can be questions of how generalizable those cases are to a wider context.
Seeing that the population of international environmental regimes is relatively
small, it must be recognized that the conclusions to this study will not be sufficient for
application to a wider context without additional trial. The value of Mill’s Method of
Difference, however, is not in establishing causality, but in “identifying covariation as a
precursor to causal claims” (Powner 2015, 126). With this in mind, this investigation of
cases will be a strong base on which future research can expand. The external validity of
the study will grow as more cases are explored.
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III.

Justification of Case Selection
Van Evera, in his chapter on the case study methodology, argues that scholars

should “select cases that best serve the purpose of their inquiry” and that “maximize the
strength and number of tests they let the investigator perform” (Van Evera 1997, 78).
Considering his list of important factors to consider when selecting the sample for a
comparative case study 7, the cases for this study have been selected based on similarity
in background conditions, the availability of data, relevance to current policy concerns,
and variance on the independent and dependent variables.
In narrowing down the cases, I compiled a list of seventeen commonly cited
international environmental regimes from the literature. This list could be categorized
into regimes that involved wider global action, such as the hazardous waste regime,
versus narrower regional action, such as the pan-European air pollution regime. Taking
the nine global regimes on the list, I looked to the cases of with markedly similar calibers
of problems, comparable periods of regime formation and development, and available
data. Because of the small population of cases to begin with, there will be variables that
cannot possibly be controlled for between the four cases. However, these aforementioned
similarities led to the selection four cases: the stratospheric ozone regime, the climate
change regime, the global oceans regime, and the biodiversity regime.
The stratospheric ozone regime and climate change regime can generally be
described as market-enabling regimes. On the other hand, the global oceans regime and
the biodiversity regime are more strictly regulatory. These four regimes are all embedded

7

For a method of difference methodology, the most important considerations were “data richness; extreme
values on the independent variable, dependent variable, or condition variable; the resemblance of case
background conditions to the conditions of current policy problems; the appropriateness for controlled
comparison with other cases; and appropriateness for replication of previous tests” (Van Evera 1997, 77-8).
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within the United Nations system, a major institution in environmental governance,
giving them institutional comparability. Although there are varying degrees of civil
society mobilization around each particular issue area, these four issues are widely
recognized and publicized by actors around the globe as serious concerns. The
timeframes are a bit widespread, with the earliest institutional concretization of the
biodiversity regime in 1973, the ocean regime dating to 1982, the stratospheric ozone
regime formalizing in 1985, and the climate change regime coming into being in 1992.
However, as each regime has been in place for nearly three decades and has seen follow
up action from the participants, there is a considerable degree of comparability across the
cases.

IV.

Operationalizing Variables

A. Independent Variable: Market-Enabling or Regulatory
As discussed in the literature review, international environmental regimes are
generally seen as regulatory because of their tendency to “restrict market opportunities
for MNCs and create costly compliance requirements” in order to achieve their goals
(Levy and Prakash 2003, 133). Despite these clear constraints on business, environmental
regimes often utilize non-regulatory mechanisms as well (Young 2014). Some regimes
are able to use of restrictions to encourage new technologies to be created by the private
sector (Levy and Prakash 2003). This creation of new markets opportunities to be filled
by corporations stimulates certain MNC businesses, encouraging compliance even when
there are regulations present.
While looking at the action plans of the regime agreements in question, this
distinction in the regime design’s main practices will be used to code an international
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environmental regime as market-enabling or regulatory. A regime whose method of
action relies strictly on changing actors’ behaviors through guidelines or regulation will
be coded as regulatory. Regimes that rely more heavily on technology development as a
means of encouraging compliance, will be coded as market-enabling, even if regulation is
also an implemented strategy.

A. Dependent Variable 1: Institutional Effectiveness
There is an ongoing scholarly debate over how to create a measure of regime
effectiveness. Much of the literature suggests that institutional effectiveness can be
gauged at both the design stage and implementation stage of the regime process
(Breitmeier 2013, 166-7). Both of these stages are considered in the four-point scale seen
in Table 3.2, which measures institutional effectiveness. The first two indicators deal
with the efficiency and persistence of the regime’s inception, while the second two
indicators largely tackle the implementation of the regime’s agreement. With one point
rewarded for each indicator checked off, the point system works as follows.
Table 3.2 Measure of Institutional Effectiveness
The agreement was completed on the prescribed timeline without
major hold ups. (1)
The institutional framework has been revisited and updated at least
once since its original inception. (1)
There are mechanisms in place for the enforcement of the
agreement, such as inspections or reporting. (1)
The regime features mechanisms for the generation and widespread
distribution of information. (1)
Total 4 – institutionally effective, 3 – largely institutionally effective,
2 – partially institutionally effective, 1/0 – institutionally ineffective
With the presence of all four indicators, a regime is considered institutionally
effective, as it has been expertly drafted and carried out. With three of the indicators met,
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the regime is deemed largely institutionally effective. Two indicators yield a partially
institutionally effective regime. Finally, with one or zero indicators met, the regime is
coded as institutionally ineffective.

B. Dependent Variable 2: Ecological Effectiveness
Because variety of influences that contribute to environmental issues, attributing
the post-regime environmental reality to the action of the regime is incredibly difficult, if
not entirely impossible (Jackson and Bührs 2015). As a result, strictly using pre-regime
and post-regime indicators of overall global environmental health for comparison will not
be fruitful. To avoid this issue while gaining an understanding of how well a regime
solves its problem, researchers have historically used measures of goal attainment. While
using a regime’s own guidelines for success may be helpful in measuring effectiveness,
one must be critical of the goals themselves, as they may be achieved thoroughly but fail
to address the original problem (Breitmeier 2013). While each measurement method is
problematic individually, using them together can help balance out these issues.
This study makes use of a behavioral-environmental hybrid measurement method,
which takes into account the regime’s goal attainment in addition to ecological measures.
Noting that the regimes in question are environmental in nature, the chosen indicators
aim to capture the behavioral-environmental balance described above by engaging with
the goals of the agreements themselves.
Below is the four-point system for categorizing a regime’s level of ecological
effectiveness. The first indicator looks at the ecological validity of the regime design. A
regime may be able to change behavior to meet its goals, but if those goals are not ground
in the recommendations of scientific discourse, their impact on the environment would be
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minimal. Finally, the fourth indicator considers the overall environmental changes taking
place. When taken alone, overall biophysical indicators cannot be traced back to a
regime. However, taken with these other three measurements, it can hold value in
assessing the larger impact of the regime.
The second and third indicators focus on behavioral change and goal attainment.
If the main means by which international regimes attain their goals is to change the
accepted social, political, or economic norms, it seems fair to judge the regime on the
breadth and depth of its impact on behavioral change. A threshold of 85% of signatories
changing their behavior would indicate a strong social pressure and a significant change
in the accepted norms. If a strong majority, or 70% of the signatories were to meet the
regulations set forth by the regime, it could be said that this social change being
implemented largely met the goals of the regime. Although there are no widely accepted
thresholds for determining effectiveness in behavioral change, these two measures
together signify tangible change.
Similar to the measure of institutional effectiveness, the scoring of ecological
effectiveness can deem the regime ecologically effective, largely ecologically effective,
partially ecologically effective, or ecologically ineffective.
Table 3.3 Measure of Ecological Effectiveness
ss

Total

The regime’s specific goals were created in response to scientific
discourse. (1)
Over 85% of the state signatories changed their behavior during the
implementation phase of the regime. (1)
Over 70% of actors meet the regime’s regulations in their respective
issue areas. (1)
Positive biophysical impacts are observable after regime
implementation. (1)
4 – ecologically effective, 3 – largely ecologically effective,
2 – partially ecologically effective, 1/0 – ecologically ineffective
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C. Summary and Expectation
This project’s most similar comparative case study method analyzes the
relationship between market-enabling regimes and effectiveness. The previous sections
have operationalized the variables of interest by using indicators frequently used by the
literature or by creating new indicators from scholarly suggestions. Upon completing the
analysis of the cases, the conclusion will compare the scores of each regime on each
respective measurement scales. If the hypotheses are to be accepted, the data would need
to indicate that regimes coded as market-enabling have higher scores in institutional
effectiveness and lower scores in ecological effectiveness. If one is true, but not the other,
one hypothesis may be accepted and the other rejecting.
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Chapter 4: Analysis
After analyzing the literature surrounding multinational corporate actors and international
environmental regimes and establishing a methodology for analyzing the relationship
between the two, this chapter will turn to a deep study of four cases: the stratospheric
ozone regime, the climate change regime, the global oceans regime, and the biodiversity
regime. The introduction to each case will document its formation and progression as an
international force. Then, the discussion will focus more intentionally on how the regime
has created barriers or opportunities for its related economic markets. Using the
indicators of effectiveness discussed in the previous section, the final analysis will assess
the success of the regime, in both an institutional and ecological sense. Finally, each case
study will conclude with a discussion of the relationship between the regime’s economic
mechanisms and its resulting levels of effectiveness.
As per the hypotheses, I have two expectations for this relationship. Firstly,
market-enabling regimes will be more institutionally effective than their regulatory
counterparts. Simultaneously, these market-enabling regimes will have a lower level of
ecological effectiveness than regulatory regimes.
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Case 1: Stratospheric Ozone Regime
The realization in the mid-1970s that chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) were causing
significant damage to the Earth’s ozone layer resulted in a considerably quick move to
action by international actors. Following about a decade of widespread scientific
knowledge sharing and negotiation, the international stratospheric ozone regime was
solidified under the authority of the United Nations Ozone Secretariat. Through enacting
national and global regulations on the corporate production and use of CFC and other
ODSs, the international community has seen a significant reduction in the threat to the
ozone. Today, the stratospheric ozone regime remains intact and is seen as one of the
most successful instances of global collective action.
The case of stratospheric ozone governance seems to indicate that a regime’s
relationship to the market is a phenomenon worth considering while assessing its
effectiveness. By regulating dangerous substances and encouraging the development of
new technologies, the ozone regime simultaneously disabled the existing business
practices of the chemical industry and realigned future market actions with specific and
sustainable goals. After completing an assessment of the institutional and ecological
successes of the ozone regime, I argue that the regime structure in relation to the market
and the consequent response of business actors created conditions that contributed to the
regime’s overall success.

I. Background
A. Discovery of Ozone Depletion
Ozone is a naturally occurring substance comprised of three oxygen atoms that
can be found in higher concentrations between 15 and 35 km above the surface of the
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Earth in the stratosphere (UNEP Ozone Secretariat 2020). This ozone layer acts as a
shield for life on Earth, as it filters out the sun’s damaging ultraviolet (UV) radiation
(Andersen et al. 2013; UNEP Ozone Secretariat 2020). However, the beginning in the
1960s, some scientists began to see evidence of disruption to this process; many began
“suspecting that pollutants from several kinds of human activities risked disrupting the
ozone layer” (Parson 2003, Chapter 1, 3).
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, this scientific literature surrounding the ozone
layer and ozone depleting substances (ODSs) developed significantly. Culminating with
the 1974 publication from Molina and Rowland that concluded that the release of
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), often found as propellants in aerosol cans, into the
atmosphere was a serious threat to the ozone layer. They explained that continuing on the
current global business path, which was producing over 500,000 metric tons of CFCs per
year, would result in a 7-13% decrease in the atmospheric ozone (Molina and Rowland
1974; Andersen et al. 2013, 612). Cited as one of the most influential findings of the
time, Molina and Rowland’s stark findings about the prospect of ozone loss pushed
scientific and governmental bodies across the globe into action.

B. Early Instances of National Regulation
In the subsequent years, the scientific community continued to research how
CFCs and other ODSs could present serious challenges for the sustenance of human life
on earth. Scientists explained how the loss of the ozone layer would “increase the
intensity of UV radiation reaching the earth’s surface,” and result in catastrophic climate
changes, food insecurity due to agroecosystem changes, and significant increases in
health problems like skin and eye diseases (Parson 2003, Chapter 1, 3; Andersen et al.
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2013). With the prospect of disaster in mind, some countries, including the United States,
Canada, Sweden and Norway, established national restrictions in 1978 to limit the
production of CFCs and the use of non-essential chemical aerosol propellants (Parson
2003, Chapter 3). However, facing growing evidence of the consequences of using ODSs,
it became clear that a more global effort would be needed to tackle the problem (Parson
2003, Chapter 1, 3).

C. Building Global Effort
The first major international effort to combat ozone depletion began in 1977 with
the creation of the UNEP Coordinating Committee on the Ozone Layer (CCOL).
Bringing together the efforts of 16 countries, the European Economic Community (EEC),
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Chemical
Manufacturers Association, and the International Council of Scientific Unions, the CCOL
served as a place to both coordinate the collection of scientific data and exchange the
results of these scientific explorations (Glas 1989; Andersen et al. 2013, 614). While
there was no direct agreement produced from these efforts, the group met annually to
compile a status report on the ozone. By shedding light on the consequences of inaction,
these combined and individual scientific efforts set forth a plan of action that would need
adopting in the future.
In the early 1980s, research teams, such as the Japanese Meteorological Research
Institute and the British Antarctic Survey, first discovered evidence of an area of depleted
ozone above Antarctica (Andersen et al. 2013). What was assumed to be an equipment
measurement error in early years of research was soon widely accepted as a dangerous
and actively growing “ozone hole” in 1985 (Glas 1989, 145; Andersen et al. 2013, 615).
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This discovery, combined with the already mounting evidence of the ozone depleting
properties of CFCs and similar chemicals, further pressured governmental bodies to take
action collectively.

D. Creation of Vienna & Montreal
With a need for international action noted by the CCOL reports, the UNEP invited
the CFC producing nations and a number of developing nations to attend meetings with
an ad hoc group on the ozone layer beginning in early 1982 (Glas 1989; Parson 2003,
Chapter 5, 6). While early meetings focused on compiling and presenting scientific
reports and assessments from organizations such as UNEP’s CCOL, the U.S. National
Aeronautical and Space Administration (NASA), and the World Meteorological
Organization (WMO), discussions soon moved into the creation of a global convention
for the monitoring and control of CFCs (Glas 1989; Parson 2003, Chapter 5).
Negotiations stalled for the next few years, as nations disagreed on what
provisions would best serve their personal and global interests. However, the group
continued to meet until the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone
Layer emerged from their efforts (UNEP). The Vienna Convention, based on the
provisions set forth in the 1977 CCOL plan of action, adopted a “hybrid system:
compulsory participation in a nonbinding process” (Parson 2003, Chapter 5, 15). This
system, which allows nations who ratify the agreement to self-determine the provisions
by which to abide, has had a limited ability to change and enforce global actors’
behaviors. Nonetheless, the Vienna Convention has provided a framework for the
continued cooperation of nations and has strengthened the legitimacy of the UNEP to
spearhead these environmental efforts (Parson 2003, Chapter 5, 16).
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Emerging from this UNEP ozone framework, the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer was opened for signature in September 1987
(Glas 1989). This Protocol creates legally binding restrictions on the production and
consumption of six classifications, or Annexes, of ozone depleting substances (UN
Ozone Secretariat 2020). By 1989 when the Montreal Protocol entered into force, it had
46 signatories (Glas 1989). Twenty years later, all 198 UN Member States had ratified
the Montreal Protocol, making it the only universally ratified UN treaty in the
organization’s history (UN Ozone Secretariat 2020).

II. Relationship to Market (Independent Variable)
The regulations introduced by the Vienna Convention and Montreal Protocol have
placed limitations on state and corporate use of chemicals that harm the ozone. By
looking both at these regulations imposed by regime agreements and at the market
opportunities created by these regulations, this section will analyze the relationship
between the regime and the global market for producing and using CFCs and ODSs. This
analysis should provide a full understanding on how the behavior of industry actors has
played into the larger narrative of the stratospheric ozone regime.

A. Early Use of CFCs
CFCs were discovered in 1928, as scientists searched for safer and more efficient
refrigeration methods for homes (Glas 1989). Soon, it was discovered that CFCs could
enhance other products as well, from air conditioning, insulation, electronics, aerosols,
medical devices, and more (Glas 1989, Alliance for Responsible Atmospheric Policy
2014). With so many uses and a growing market, the industry for CFC production and
use expanded rapidly throughout the mid-twentieth century.
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The mounting evidence of the role of CFCs in the depletion of ozone, however,
caused growing concern in the international community throughout the 1970s. As
discussions of CFC regulation began, the CFC industry noticed the threat and took an
initial combative position (Falkner 2008). In the United States, for example, the chemical
industry, with the scientific evidence of the time, argued for an unregulated CFC market.
Their initial scattered lobbying efforts had been unable to prevent the 1978 enacting of
regulation on CFC use in aerosols. Consequently, the U.S. industry, led by chemical
powerhouse DuPont, formed the Alliance for Responsible CFC Policy in the summer of
1980 (Falkner 2008; Alliance for Responsible Atmospheric Policy 2014). The Alliance,
in its early ears, coordinated scientific, economic, and legal efforts to halt the efforts of
the U.S. government to enact further regulation on CFCs. However, as the strategies of
CFC producers shifted with time, the Alliance has remained a representative of the
interests of CFC producers and users.

B. National Regulation Causes CFC Market Shifts
As regulations on the non-essential production or use of CFCs emerged in the
U.S., Canada, Norway, and Sweden in 1978, and then throughout the European
Economic Community (EEC) in 1980, the overall CFC industry began to move away
from their anti-regulatory stance (Dudek, LeBlanc, Sewall 1990). While the United
States’ production and use of CFCs in products, such as automobile air conditioning,
continued to increase during the late 1970s, there was sharp decline in aerosol CFC
products (Glas 1989; Parson 2003, Chapter 5, 4). With CFCs in aerosols representing a
significant portion of the overall CFC production, “total U.S. production of CFCs 11 and
12 fell 45 percent from 1974 to 1980” (Parson 2003, Chapter 5, 5). In Europe, this
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decline was mirrored, but much more gradually, with aerosol CFC production contracting
by 37 percent by 1982 (Parson 2003, Chapter 5, 5). Despite the market shifting away
from aerosol use, the overall production of CFCs outside of North America and Europe
continued to rise (Parson 2003, Chapter 5, 5).
Overall, the national and regional CFC regulations enacted from 1978 to 1980 did
not result in the reduction in CFC production growth that the governments had hoped for.
Despite its failure in the direct sense, these regulations did provide a nudge for CFC
industry leaders to begin the research on and the development of CFC alternatives. Many
industry leaders in CFC production, including DuPont and Imperial Chemical Industries,
launched research programs into CFC substitutes in the mid-1970s (Parson 2003, Chapter
5). As early as 1980, they had determined that other substances, like hydrofluorocarbons
(HFCs) and hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs), could replace many of CFC technical
functions without dealing as much damage to the ozone (Parson 2003, Chapter 5).
Although technically feasible CFC alternatives had been discovered, projects
estimated that the production of these substances could cost up to five times more than
that of CFCs and would require about five years of development to bring to market
(Parson 2003, Chapter 5). These high development costs made the substitutes far from
ideal products in the existing global marketplace. As a result, industry actors had largely
abandoned their research efforts by 1981.
CFC-producing industries continued to hold their combative position against CFC
regulation. They maintained that CFC regulation was neither necessary nor favorable
because (1) “scientific evidence remained too uncertain,” (2) “viable CFC alternatives did
not exist for most uses,” and (3) “CFC markets were likely to grow little, if at all”
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(Parson 2003, Chapter 5, 20). Despite their assertions, the international community
witnessed the breakdown of this argument in the mid-1980s. Firstly, scientific
publications, particularly the discovery of the ozone hole over Antarctica, continued to
point to severe ozone destruction from excessive CFC usage (Andersen et al. 2013).
Secondly, DuPont widely publicized the findings of their CFC substitute research in
March of 1986, fully informing governmental actors and activists that more sustainable
substitutes for many CFC uses were, in fact, “technically feasible” (Parson 2003, Chapter
5, 17). Finally, the CFC production continued to have a positive growth following a
period of stability in 1981 and 1982 (Parson 2003, Chapter 5). With very little ground left
to stand on against the prospect of additional national and international regulation, the
CFC producers and users were forced to confront a reality of impending CFC regulations.

C. CFC Producers Begin Shifting Position
The American-based Alliance announced in 1985 that it “would support
internationally negotiated limits on future rates of CFC emissions growth” (Parson 2003,
Chapter 5, 20). This dramatic shift was led by the three largest American CFC producers
— DuPont, Allied, and Pennwalt. Alliance Chairman Richard Barnett explained that the
group had decided “on the basis of current information,” that the “large increases in fully
halogenated CFCs. . . would be unacceptable to future generations” (Barnett 1986, qtd. in
Parson, Chapter 5, 20). Considering the implications of potential CFC growth, the
Alliance would support a “reasonable global limit on the future rate of growth” of
emissions and would resume its corporate efforts to develop CFC substitutes (Barnett
1986, qtd. in Parson, Chapter 5, 20). This shift in the position of industry leaders
represented a major turning point in the relationship between the stratospheric ozone
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regime and related businesses. Following this moment, businesses were less opposed to
both accepting and complying with CFC regulations.

D. Analysis of Regime-Market Relationship
The stratospheric ozone regime, with the introduction of the 1987 Montreal
Protocol, placed significant binding regulations on the use of CFCs and other ODSs.
However, the gradual introduction of some national and non-binding global regulations
prompted industries to search for creative solutions to the issue before the global
regulations entered into force. The corporate development of technically comparable
substitutes allowed the binding regulations of the Montreal Protocol to increase the
market price of ODS, making the once costly substitutes more competitive in the
chemical marketplace. Although the stratospheric ozone regime has certainly imposed
strict regulations on businesses, its effort toward developing new sectors of the chemical
market renders the regime market-enabling.

III.

Effectiveness (Dependent Variable)
In looking back at the creation, development, and impacts of the stratospheric

ozone regime, this section evaluates its effectiveness. Beginning with institutional
effectiveness and then proceeding to ecological effectiveness, the selected indicators
from the literature are employed to give the ozone regime a ranking from 0-4.

A. Institutional Effectiveness
i. The agreement was completed on the prescribed timeline without
major hold ups.
The 1974 publication of Molina and Rowland’s scientific report on the dangers of
widespread CFC use on the Earth’s ozone served as the major call to action for
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international community to take action on ozone depletion. The subsequent information
sharing efforts of the UNEP’s CCOL, which began meeting in 1977, led into the 1985
establishment of the Vienna Convention. This framework, which marked the first formal
institutionalization of the ozone regime, directly translated into the Montreal Protocol in
1987. While this period of 13 years between the major scientific publication and the
binding international agreement is not negligible, it is quite impressive that the majority
of state actors collectively accepted the threat of ozone depletion, funded and completed
scientific research, created a plan of policy action, and came to a comprehensive
agreement in this short amount of time. (1 point).
ii. The institutional framework has been revisited and updated at least
once since its original inception.
Following the creation of the Vienna Convention Framework in 1985, the UN
Ozone Secretariat has continued to organize and host the meetings the goals and progress
stratospheric ozone regime (UNEP Ozone Secretariat 2020). Following the
implementation of the Montreal Protocol in 1989, the signatories have reconvened for the
addition of amendments to the Protocol at London in 1990, Copenhagen in 1992, Vienna
in 1995, Montreal in 1997, Beijing in 1999, and Kigali in 2016 (UNEP Ozone Secretariat
2020). As scientific research has progressed and technologies have been developed, these
additions have updated the original regulations to account for additional ODSs, like
hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs). To this day, the Ozone Secretariat has continued to
bring signatories together in approximate three-year increments to monitor the regulation
of substances, continue sharing information, and draft new policy options for the
protection of the ozone. (1 point).
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iii. There are mechanisms in place for the enforcement of the agreement,
such as inspections or reporting.
Article 7 of the Montreal Protocol outlines the procedures for the Reporting of
Data related to regulated ozone depleted substances. With slight variation based on the
nation and substance in question, Article 7 states that “each party is required to report its
annual production, imports and exports of each individual controlled substance” (UN
Ozone Secretariat 2020, 391). Today, the Ozone Secretariat operates an online reporting
system into which nations can input their data. In each Meeting of Parties, the group
monitors each nation’s reporting activities and takes action against any non-compliance,
as outlined for each individual signatory nation in Article 8 (UN Ozone Secretariat 2020).
(1 point).
iv. The regime features mechanisms for the generation and widespread
distribution of information.
Because of the instrumentality of proper and up-to-date scientific knowledge to
the protection of the ozone layer, the Montreal Protocol has explicitly outlined how the
Parties should produce and share this information in Article 9: Research, development,
public awareness and exchange of information. Firstly, it explains that nations, as
Protocol signatories, have the responsibility of “promoting, directly or through competent
international bodies, research, development and exchange of information” related to “best
technologies,” “possible alternatives to controlled substances,” and “costs and benefits of
relevant control strategies” (UNEP Ozone Secretariat 2020, 25). This sharing of
information amongst Protocol signatories and the public continues to bring widespread
awareness and understanding to the issue of ozone depletion. Examples of efforts brought
about by Article 9 can be seen in the Secretariat’s production and dissemination of
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scientific reports, hosting of scientific panels and workshops, and presentation of
accessible materials for the public on the Ozone Secretariat’s website. (1 point).

B. Ecological Effectiveness
i.

The regime’s specific goals were created in response to scientific
discourse.

The stratospheric ozone regime emerged in direct response to the developing
scientific knowledge on the damaging effects of ODS usage, particularly the 1974
publication from Molina and Rowland and the discovery of the Antarctic “ozone hole”
(Andersen et al. 2013). With scientific development as the main force behind the jump to
regime institutionalization, international actors have paid particular attention to the voices
of the scientific community throughout the regime development process. Globally
organized groups, such as the environmental committee of the OECD and the UNEP’s
CCOL, have brought forward novel global scientific predictions on the causes and effects
of ozone depletion to inform the policy options (Parson 2013, Chapter 3). As novel
scientific research has been published since the inception of the Montreal Protocol in
1987, the agreement has been amended to include more restrictive limits on the original
classes of regulated chemicals, novel regulations on new classes of chemicals (such as
HCFCs), and suggestions on new ODS-substitute technology (Andersen et al. 2013). This
demonstrates a clear dedication to including scientific ozone discourse in the
development of the stratospheric ozone regime. (1 point).
ii.

Over 85% of the state signatories changed their behavior during the
implementation phase of the regime.

As of 2009, the Montreal Protocol had garnered the support of every United
Nations member state. The mere act of signing and ratifying the legislation demonstrates
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a willingness by these signatories to work toward the mission of the Protocol. This
dedication to bringing behavioral change becomes even more evident when looking at the
progress made in the phasing out of CFCs, Montreal Protocol’s Annex A, Group I of
regulated chemicals. In 2019, over 90% of the ratifiers reported data on their CFC
consumption levels. Of those reported, all had reduced their CFC consumption to a zero
or below-zero value (UNEP Ozone Secretariat 2021). While the Montreal Protocol has
expanded since its inception to regulate a whole host of other harmful chemicals, states
have demonstrated, by reporting and regulating their consumption of CFCs, their
dedication to ozone protection, regardless of their individual interests. The Protocol,
through its policy implementation and norm building, has created significant behavioral
change. (1 point).
iii.

Over 70% of actors meet the regime’s regulations in their respective
issue areas.

While the Montreal Protocol has clearly prompted widespread behavioral change,
as discussed above, it has also generated the ability for signatories to fulfil the regime
objectives. Through the adoption of a noncompliance procedure and a multilateral fund,
the Protocol has established clear incentives and a means for all types of actors to reach
long-term compliance (Murase et al. 1995; UN Ozone Secretariat 2020). These
mechanisms, although complex to build and implement, have led each of the 193
ratifying nations to achieve full compliance with the provisions of the Protocol (Andersen
et al. 2013, 640). The stratospheric ozone regime’s established regulations have been
fully met by all actors. (1 point).
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iv.

Positive biophysical impacts are observable after regime
implementation.

The 2018 Scientific Assessment of Ozone Depletion completed by the World
Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the UNEP represents the most recent
information regarding the state of the ozone. This assessment states that the “actions
taken under the Montreal Protocol have led to decreases in the atmospheric abundance of
controlled ozone-depleting substances (ODSs) and the start of the recovery of
stratospheric ozone” (World Meteorological Organization 2018, ES.3). Despite a recent
resurgence of global CFC-11 emissions, scientists are estimating that with the continued
compliance to the Protocol’s regulations, the ozone above the Northern Hemisphere will
return to its 1980 levels in the 2030s and the ozone above the Southern Hemisphere will
return in the 2060s (World Meteorological Organization 2018). This observed recovery
following the implementation of stratospheric ozone regime regulations indicates a high
level of ecological regime effectiveness. (1 point).

IV.

Conclusion
Stratospheric Ozone Regime
Market Relationship: Market-Enabling
Institutional Effectiveness: 4/4 (institutionally effective)
Ecological Effectiveness: 4/4 (ecologically effective)
The two project hypotheses, which make relational statements about different

types of regimes, require a cross-case comparison to be properly evaluated. However, this
conclusion section will pull out some of the main points highlighted throughout the
investigation of the stratospheric ozone regime.
The stratospheric ozone regime case is well-known by policymakers and scholars
alike as a prime example of global governance. After having evaluated the regime for the
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selection of eight effectiveness indicators, I can better understand why this is the case. As
demonstrated by the perfect score of four (4/4) within the institutional effectiveness
indicators, the threat of ozone depletion prompted international actors to make quick,
decisive action to rid industry of ODS usage. The regime simultaneously established an
effective system of accountability and mechanisms to keep the regulatory framework up
to date with new information and policy.
With a strong institution beneath it, the stratospheric ozone regime was able to
promote behavioral change among state and corporate actors, eventually reaching full UN
participation and full compliance. Also receiving a perfect score of four (4/4) within the
ecological effectiveness indicators of this study, the regime has created the changes that
have led to a reversal or ozone depletion trends and clear ecological progress. While the
regime is not perfect, it has demonstrated an ability to overcome the difficulties in
crafting and implementing global environmental policy.
The 2013 journal article from Andersen et al. gives a valuable and succinct
account of the stratospheric ozone regime’s success.
Every United Nations state is a member of the Montreal Protocol and
every country is in full compliance. Ninety-eight percent of ODS
production and consumption of nearly 100 industrial chemicals has been
phased out to the satisfaction of public, corporate, and government
stakeholders. The transition has been so smooth that science skeptics are
silent, few scholars find fault with the treaty or its implementation,
companies and military organizations are proud of what has been
accomplished, and consumers have hardly noticed (640).
By taking account of the interests of a wide variety of actors, from statespeople to
members of civil society, the stratospheric ozone regime was able to garner widespread
support and compliance. This enabled the regime to find success in realizing of its goals
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of ozone protection. Of particular interest for this study, however, is how the relationship
of the regime regulatory structure to corporate actors played into the regime’s success.
In placing regulations on the production and consumption of CFCs and other
ODSs, the stratospheric ozone certainly has imposed high costs for chemical market
actors to continue with their business as usual. Without an attractive and practical path
forward within the limits of the regime, this could have provided sufficient incentive for
international actors to be non-cooperative or defect in the face of regulation.
However, the early introduction of national bans on CFCs had prompted fruitful
technical research by leading chemical firms, leading to the discovery of feasible
substitutes to replace the technical functions of ODSs. Although these technologies were
initially far more expensive to produce, the Montreal Protocol raised the cost of using the
damaging ODSs and made the substitutes more competitive in the market. Therefore,
when powerful chemical firms were faced with costly Montreal Protocol regulations, they
often chose to adopt these economically viable, new technologies and advance their
businesses within the limits of the regime, rather than defect and pay the subsequent
penalties.
All in all, it seems that corporate actors were more likely to comply with the
regulations set forth by the regime because the costly, legally binding regime regulations
coupled with the scientifically viable ODS substitutes caused the cost of compliance to
fall below the cost of defection. This relatively low cost of compliance is why the
stratospheric ozone regime produced such high levels of both institutional and ecological
effectiveness.
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Although not directly related to the hypothesis, this case also demonstrates the
importance of the scientific nature of the global environmental issue is to the ability of
international actors to find a solution. Early advancements in scientific literature
indicated that ozone could be destroyed by the use CFCs and ODSs. With this
understanding established, the international scientific community was able to trace the
rapid depletion of the earth’s ozone to the use of a small class of chemicals by a relatively
small group of market actors. With a clear cause to the environmental problem identified,
the regime was able to provide a focused path forward for state and corporate actors.
Finally, another potentially influential aspect of the regime’s effectiveness is the
timing of regulation introduction. As noted above, many national actors, such as the US
and Norway, introduced a ban on aerosol CFCs in the 1970s. By introducing these
regulations at an earlier time, policymakers gave an indication of their future intent to
market actors, allowing them some time to react before the later, more arduous
regulations were introduced.
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Case 2: Climate Change Regime
Climate change is recognized by all types of international actors as one of the most
threatening challenges of today. Since the 18th century, scientists have witnessed a steady
increase in the surface temperature of the Earth (Falkner 2008). Although many elements
of climate science still are fraught with uncertainty, the general consensus has attributed
this global warming phenomenon to the rapid industrialization of agricultural and
manufacturing practices. These practices, which include shifts in land use and increase in
amounts of fossil fuels burned, have caused a spike in the atmospheric concentrations of
three main greenhouse gasses: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), and nitrous oxide
(N2O) (Falkner 2008, 95). These high concentrations of greenhouse gasses have trapped
heat within the Earth’s atmosphere and caused the warming of the Earth’s surface.
While warming and cooling are natural earthly processes, it is the rapidity of the
current trend of global warming that has been the foundation of global concern. The
overall increase in temperature has amplified the chance for environmental disasters, such
as rising sea levels, destructive weather patterns, desertification, and draught, among
others (Patrick 2013). For many nations, particularly developing states, these events may
lead to the loss of coastal land, reduced agricultural yield, higher levels of infectious
diseases, and significant water shortages (Falkner 2008). These events, then, threaten to
cause a host of secondary problems, such as regional conflict and instability.
With this eminent threat, state governments, nongovernmental organizations,
scientific panels, corporate bodies, academics, and civil society actors have coalesced to
find solutions for both the mitigation of and adaptation to climate change. The resulting
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international climate change regime is situated largely within the United Nations system
under the Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
Although the climate change regime has been designed to handle an ecological
issue, it does not operate in isolation. Through a discussion of the history of climate
change governance, it becomes evident that the regime is part of a much larger and
complex web of international issues. In particular, the integration of climate change
regulation with the fossil fuel industries ties it to issues of security, economic
development and finance, public health, and energy (Patrick 2013). Although the
forthcoming evaluation focuses on environmental implications of the climate change
regime, it must be situated within the greater complex of international issues.
This case study further discusses this relationship between the climate change
issue with prominent energy-related industries, as one that has both imposed regulations
on many existing firms and created opportunities for market expansion through new
technologies, such as renewable energies and carbon capture and storage (CCS). The
current literature on business strategic responses to regulatory policy will inform the
connection between the presence of market opportunities and the responses of corporate
actors to regime regulations. Despite the ecological threats presented by climate change
and the potential for sustainable growth of clean energy markets, many firms have
continued to oppose the creation of emissions regulations.
The final section is an evaluation of the regime’s overall effectiveness using
institutional indicators to determine the functionality of the regime design and
mechanisms and using ecological indicators to determine how well the regime has
addressed the issue of climate change. Overall, the regime is considerably effective in an
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institutional manner, but has been unsuccessful in converting this momentum into
positive climate impacts. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the environmental,
contextual, and corporate factors that may be contributing to this outcome.

I. Background
A. Scientific Discovery and Progress
The scientific connection between the use of fossil fuels and global warming can
be traced to the late 19th century. While scientists recognized this relationship, the true
threat of greenhouse gasses was not fully realized until the late 1960s when
meteorologists Manabe and Wetherald published their initial projections on forthcoming
global temperature increases (Patrick 2013; Council on Foreign Relations 2021). The
alarm bells sounded by this study prompted many international actors, from states to
NGOs, to further research climate change. These efforts were scattered for a couple
decades. It was not until the 1980s and 1990s that the international community began to
coordinate the development of “a better understanding of climate change and its effects”
(Falkner 2008, 96).
In 1985, UNEP, the WMO and the International Council for Science (ICSU)
organized the first major international effort to compile scientific assessments on climate
change and draft relevant policy solutions (Franz 1997). While no agreements were made
at the Villach Conference, the attempt to align scientific discourse increased the sense of
urgency for international action.
Another major step toward the institutionalization of a climate change regime was
the creation of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988.
Organized by UNEP and the WMO, the IPCC consists of 195 member states that work
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together “provide policymakers with regular assessments of the scientific basis of climate
change, its impacts and future risks, and options for adaptation and mitigation” (IPCC
Secretariat 2013). For the past three decades, the IPCC has compiled this information on
climate science and related policy options into series of accessible publications.

B. Development of the UN Climate Framework
With global efforts in place to coordinate the development and dissemination of
scientific information on climate change by the start of the 1990s, global actors moved to
take more direct action. In 1992, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) was launched. Recognizing the environmental threat presented by excess
greenhouse gasses, the UNFCCC has aimed to avoid anthropocentric damage to the
ecosystem (United Nations Framework Convention of Climate Change 1992). Today,
there are 197 parties to the Convention who meet annually in the Conference of Parties
(COP) (Patrick 2013).
During the third Conference of Parties (COP-3) in 1997, the Kyoto Protocol was
adopted as the first major piece of global climate change legislation. Entering force in
2005, the Protocol is a legally binding commitment of signatories to meet individual
targets for levels of greenhouse gas emissions. In order to appropriately address the
concentration of emissions that come from industrialized nations, the Kyoto Protocol
separated the responsibility of emission reduction based on industrialization level and
created the base of an emissions trading system (Napoli 2012).
Following the enactment of the Kyoto Protocol, international climate change
related effort focused on its achievement. The yearly COP meetings continued to support
stronger international action within the realm of Kyoto’s provisions. The 2009
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Copenhagen Accord (COP-15), for example, provided strength to the regime’s
mechanisms for reporting emissions levels and supporting developing nations.
At the same time, the COP meetings highlighted the lingering disagreements on
how to best enforce emission targets (UNFCCC 2021a). These heated disputes informed
the need for a new international agreement for dealing with climate change. In the
meantime, the parties present at the COP-17 meeting, facing the expiration of the Kyoto
Protocol at the end of 2012, agreed on the 2011 Durban Platform for Enhanced Action.
The Platform extended the Kyoto Protocol through 2017, while this new treaty
framework was being developed.
The twenty-first session of the UNFCCC COP (COP-21) in 2015 resulted in the
signing of the Paris Agreement. Although the agreements from Kyoto and Paris were
theoretically meant to work tangentially, the Paris Agreement has essentially superseded
the Kyoto Protocol in practice. Unlike the top-down emissions targets established by
Kyoto, the Paris Agreement requires signatories to set their own emissions targets, or
nationally determined contributions (NDCs) (Conference of Parties to the UNFCCC
2015; Maizland 2021). These NDCs must be crafted in consideration of the Agreement’s
overall goal of achieving global net-zero emissions and limiting the increase in average
global temperature to 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. Every five years, the
progress of each nation toward achievement of their NDCs is to be transparently selfmonitored during the global stocktake (Conference of Parties to the UNFCCC 2015;
Maizland 2021). The first global stocktake is scheduled for 2023.
Because the Kyoto Protocol mainly targeted developed states in its provisions, the
2011 Durban Platform flagged the common but differentiated responsibilities of so-called
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developed states and developing states as an important consideration for future climate
governance. The Paris Agreement negotiation addressed this concern by creating a plan
to assist these developing nations. With a $100 billion pledge from developed states,
more of the financial load of climate mitigation research and development has been
placed onto industrialized states. This Paris Agreement mechanism hopes to further the
global achievement of emission targets by supporting a wider variety of global states
(Council on Foreign Relations 2021).
As described throughout the narrative above, the international climate change
regime has been largely embedded within the UNFCCC. This framework supported the
Kyoto Protocol, the original piece of global climate policy, and later fostered the
enhanced Paris Agreement. Although it still in the early years of its lifespan, the Paris
Agreement is at the forefront of the current global climate change policy.

C. Other Relevant Conventions and Bodies
The UNFCCC and its two major treaties represent concentrated global efforts to
enact emission regulation. Supporting these initiatives with specific projects, the United
Nations system features about twenty different agencies that address climate-related
issues (Council on Foreign Relations 2021). These include the UNEP, the UN
Development Program (UNDP), the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank, among others. Each agency, by
nature of their work, tackles distinctive causes and effects of climate change by slightly
different means.
Outside of the realm of the UN system, many international groups have organized
to find solutions to the climate crisis. The Major Economics Forum on Energy and
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Climate (MEF) and the Group of 20 (G20) are voluntary governmental organizations that
have aimed at brainstorming feasible emission-reduction policies with particular
consideration given to creating market opportunities for relevant industries (Patrick
2013). The C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group, a collection of 97 global cities, have
committed to taking concrete steps, such as introducing all-electric public transportation,
toward reducing the carbon-dependency of urban living (C40 Cities 2019).
Other groups, such as the Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate Action and
the Group on Earth Observations (GEO), combine the expertise and resources of
governmental, scientific, corporate, and civil society actors to brainstorm and implement
climate-related solutions (Luomi 2020; GEO 2021). While none of these aforementioned
bodies are as organized and comprehensive in scope and terms as the UNFCCC, their
collective action aims to advance humanity toward climate solutions.

II. Relationship to Market (Independent Variable)
Through the developments of recent decades in climate science, researchers have
been able to pinpoint the most dominant sources of climate change: the wide use of fossil
fuels. In order to meet the growing global demand for energy, fossil fuel industries have
increased the levels of coal, oil, and natural gas being burned. The burning releases
greenhouse gasses into the atmosphere, which have built up to dangerous levels and
caused the global warming phenomenon. To combat this trend, climate change
regulations, both at the national and international level, have aimed at restricting these
industry activities in favor of more sustainable energy practices. Despite the need for
reduced emission targets, the designers of the climate change regime have deliberately
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incorporated industry interest by means of market-enabling mechanisms, namely the
carbon market, renewable energy, and carbon capture and storage.

A. Regime Mechanisms for Enabling the Market
The so-called carbon market, the first of these market-enabling mechanisms, is a
designated place for firms to gradually reduce their greenhouse gas emissions while still
operating within a marketplace. Established as part of the Kyoto Protocol, the carbon
market allows for emissions efficient Annex I countries to sell their excess carbon
permits to less-efficient Annex I countries (Napoli 2012; UNFCCC 2021b). 8 Examples
of functioning carbon markets include the European Union emission trading system
(ETS), which was established in 2005 as the world’s first and largest carbon market
(European Commission 2016). The EU ETS operates as a cap-and-trade system that
allows companies to buy and sell their emissions allowance under a gradually shrinking
total regional threshold. Since 2007, the International Carbon Action Partnership (ICAP)
has overseen the EU ETS and other local, national, and regional carbon markets
(International Carbon Action Partnership 2021). These carbon markets have allowed
fossil fuel-dependent corporations to work together to meet global standards of emission.
The Protocol also has employed two other programs for the progression of its
emission reduction goals: Joint Implementation (JI) and the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM). While slightly different in scope in terms, both programs reward
carbon credit to Annex I countries who implement emissions reduction projects in other

8

According to the UNFCCC, “Annex I Parties include the industrialized countries that were members of
the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) in 1992, plus countries with
economies in transition (the EIT Parties), including the Russian Federation, the Baltic States, and several
Central and Eastern European States” (UNFCCC 2021c).
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nations (Napoli 2012; Patrick 2013). By creating an entirely new market for the trading
of greenhouse gas emissions allowances, these mechanisms have provided actors with
economic incentives to meet their emission goals and help other nations do the same.
Beyond emissions trading, however, the ultimate goal to regulate fossil fuel
burning and reach net zero global emissions by 2050 has opened up opportunity to move
to away from fossil fuels altogether. While the current energy infrastructure is largely
centered around fossil fuel industries, there are many renewable substitutes to fossil fuels
that have been developed and implemented on smaller scales that could serve the interest
of the wider energy market. These low-carbon energy sources include solar, wind, hydro,
geothermal, biomass, and nuclear energy, among other types of hybrid energy systems.
While adjusting the global energy grid to implement these new technologies will
surely have high initial costs, the regulations on fossil fuels could allow for the
development of this renewable energy market. The hope is that as the industry progresses
and new technologies are applied, the high initial costs will subside. Some economists
have even projected that many renewable energy sources have the capacity to become
more cost effective than coal (Gillingham 2019). With the prospect of significant growth
of the low-carbon energy technologies, the renewable energy market represents a major
opportunity for industry.
The final market-enabling mechanism from the climate change regime is
development of carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS) technologies. According to a
2005 IPCC special report on carbon capture, CCS “is a process consisting of the
separation of CO2 from industrial and energy-related sources, transport to a storage
location and long-term isolation from the atmosphere” (IPCC Secretariat 2005). By
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collecting already emitted greenhouse gasses from the atmosphere, environmental impact
assessments have suggested that CCS has the potential to reduce the global warming
potential of power plants by 63–82% (Cuéllar-Franca and Azapagic 2015). This practice
could both facilitate the gradual transition away from fossil fuels and the achievement of
net zero global emissions.
Even two decades after the Kyoto Protocol’s introduction, these technologies are
still in early phases of development and not ready for widespread use. It seems
appropriate to attribute this insufficient investment to the high costs of technology
research (Patrick 2013). Despite the slow move to innovation, the technical feasibility of
extracting excess carbon dioxide from the atmosphere is reason for hope for future
development.

B. Overview of Industry Response
Despite these mechanisms for enabling corporate actors to progress within a
variety of industries, the regulations enacted by Kyoto, Paris, and other agreements have
caused considerable conflict between industry and the climate change regime. As
discussed above, the global dependence on fossil fuels for the functioning of society has
pervaded nearly every major business sector. In general, any one firm’s climate-related
business strategy can be seen as a response to “whether climate change presents itself as a
threat or opportunity” (Falkner 2008, 99). This designation can be seen clearly in the
climate policy stances that different types of corporations have taken. 9

9
While this distinction between the general strategies of fossil fuel-dependent and fossil fuel-averse
industries can be made, it is worth noting that there are a host of business strategies found between a full
supportive and a full oppositional stance. As climate science has developed and public pressure has shifted,
corporate climate strategy has taken a variety of forms, depending on the individual interests of each firm.
However, a more nuanced discussion of these corporate strategies is outside of the realm of this study.
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Firms that would experience positive externalities from the global banning of
fossil fuels have tended to support climate-related governance. These industries, which
include renewable energy, nuclear energy, and insurance, have employed public relations
strategies and government lobbying efforts to encourage the introduction of greater
regulation (Falkner 2008, 98). These strategies, however, have generally paled in
comparison to those of more pervasive industries.
Corporations that are heavily dependent on fossil fuel usage, such as oil, gas,
electricity, manufacturing, and transportation industries, have historically opposed the
strengthening of emissions regulations. This stance aligns with their strictly economic
interests of producing a good or service by means of low-cost fossil fuel energy.
A particular striking example of this resistance to global climate change policy is
the creation of the Global Climate Coalition (GCC) following the formation of the IPCC.
In the face of threat from costly regulation, dozens of major American oil, gas, and
manufacturing companies organized “the world's first dedicated climate change lobbying
group” (Falkner 2008, 102). From its formation until it was disbanded in 2001, the GCC
represented the interests of fossil fuel-dependent companies by challenging climate
regulations at both a national level within the United States and later at the international
level.
Once the UNFCCC was established in 1992 and it had become clear that
mandatory emissions reductions were inevitable, some previously oppositional
businesses, particularly those in Europe, began “seeking to shape, not prevent a protocol
to the framework convention” (Falkner 2008, 119). Although these firms still have tried
to minimize the cost of climate regulation born by industry actors, this signified a clear
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strategy change. Many of these firms, facing the threat of business-halting regulation,
also have participated in individual and global efforts to develop innovative technical
solutions for the energy sector (Luomi 2020). While some progress over the past decades
is visible, it has been not been implemented on a wide scale. Instead, the globe still relies
predominately on a fossil fuel-based energy system.
The mass of powerful fossil fuel corporations, particularly in the United States,
have continued to resist international climate governance. Holding firmly to this antiregulatory position, there are still aggressive lobbying efforts and public campaigns to
decrease support for emissions regulation (Falkner 2008, 120). With the threat of climate
change becoming more evident, a major shift in current business practices has become
increasingly urgent. However, as the climate change regime currently exists, the hope for
corporate-driven climate solutions has largely stagnated.

C. Analysis of Regime-Market Relationship
Despite global industry’s continued resistance to participation within and
compliance with the global climate change regime, the regime mechanisms have
demonstrated clearly that it is not strictly regulatory. By allowing a variety of industries
direct benefits through the introduction of emissions regulations, the regime can be said
to enable certain existing market activities. It couples this with the conscious promotion
of opportunities to advance new innovative technologies. These considerations have led
me to categorize the climate change regime as market-enabling.

III.

Effectiveness (Dependent Variable)
This section considers the context, progression, and consequences of the global

climate change regime in order to evaluate its effectiveness. Beginning with institutional
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effectiveness and then preceding to ecological effectiveness, the selected indicators from
the literature are used to give the regime two rankings between 0 and 4 points.

A. Institutional Effectiveness
i. The agreement was completed on the prescribed timeline without
major hold ups.
While contemporary science still is fraught with disagreements over specifics of
global warming and its effects, the connection between excessive fossil fuel usage and
climate change can be traced back to the 1960s. The next decade was spent,
predominately by individual state actors, trying to grasp the nature of the issue. Once the
urgency of the problem became clearer in the mid-1980s, coordinated global effort truly
commenced, culminating in the 1992 UNFCCC agreement. Although a concrete
regulatory agreement did not emerge for another five years, the laying of the climate
change regime framework was considerably quick. (1 point).
ii. The institutional framework has been revisited and updated at least
once since its original inception.
The institutional climate change framework lies largely within the UNFCCC.
While the written terms of the overall framework have not changed since its inception in
1992, the Secretariat and Parties to the Framework Convention have convened regularly
to discuss how newly negotiated treaties, such as the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris
Agreement, have shifted the framework’s relevance and take concrete actions on dealing
with new climate science. (1 point).
iii. There are mechanisms in place for the enforcement of the agreement,
such as inspections or reporting.
One of the major critiques of the climate change regime has been the lack of
enforcement mechanisms. Parties to the UNFCCC, specifically signatories under the
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Durban Platform and Copenhagen Accord, have been encouraged to transparently report
their emissions data to the UNFCCC secretariat (UNFCCC 2021a). In many cases, global
climate norms have succeeded in encouraging signatory nations to both report their data
and adopt relevant national regulations to meet global emissions limits (Patrick 2013).
However, without an international body to enforce this practice, this system is not always
successful.
The recent Paris Agreement also operates under this type of system without
enforcement mechanisms. Under the Agreement, each nation’s achievement of their
NDCs is to be transparently self-evaluated in five-year intervals (Conference of Parties to
the UNFCCC 2015). If and when actors do not meet their emission targets, they face no
enforceable punishment. While the first regulatory period of the Paris Agreement has not
yet arrived, it is foreseeable that this lack of an authoritative monitor will lead actors to
skimp on potential progress, as it has in the past.
While reporting measures are in place, the lack of a governing enforcement body
to monitor the progress of various actors within the climate change regime is a clear
cause for concern. (0 points).
iv. The regime features mechanisms for the generation and widespread
distribution of information.
Articles 5 and 6 of the UNFCCC have briefly outlined the ways that the
framework convention will promote the progression of global “research and systematic
observation” and “education, training and public awareness” (United Nations Framework
Convention of Climate Change 1992). Through ongoing initiatives, such as the IPCC,
global actors are compiling scientific literature into synthesized and accessible reports on
the evolving condition of the climate. Research efforts, though falling short in the realm
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of technological development for fossil fuel substitutes, have been furthering the global
understanding of the climate crisis.
The accessibility of information to policymakers and the general public is also an
essential piece of the regime. Individual nations, regional groups, such as the European
Union and the African Union, and IGOs and INGOs, such as the United Nations and
Greenpeace, have sought to bring make information publicly available. These types of
efforts have increased furthered the generation and distribution of regime-related
information. (1 point).

B. Ecological Effectiveness
i. The regime’s specific goals were created in response to scientific
discourse.
The IPCC operates as the transnational body responsible for informing the climate
policy choices of the international community. The first five IPCC Assessment Reports
from 1990, 1995, 2001, 2007, and 2014 have synthesized findings of relevant climate
science into key takeaways for policymakers (IPCC Secretariat 2013). The terms of the
resulting UNFCCC treaties, such as the Kyoto Protocol, Copenhagen Accord, and Paris
Agreement, have been directly based off of this scientific discourse.
Despite having scientific bodies provide the base knowledge for the goals of the
overall climate change regime, the specific regulations on emissions levels are
determined by each nation. Within the Paris Agreement, for example, the goal of the
Paris Agreement to limit the global temperature rise to 2 degrees Celsius has been
informed by scientific indication of disaster beyond this level. However, each Party to the
Agreement can establish their own emissions targets. As a result, Germany-based
nonprofits Climate Analytics and NewClimate Institute have suggested that “if
85

governments follow through on pledges they have made so far under the Paris
Agreement, it will still result in a 2.7 ºC rise” (Climate Action Tracker 2020; Maizland
2021, 7). This criticism from scientific and civil society actors argues that the current
agreements are insufficient to both meet the goals of the climate regime and mitigate the
worst effects of climate change.10 (0 points).
ii. Over 85% of the state signatories changed their behavior during the
implementation phase of the regime.
If behavior change is equated to the reduction of emissions from what a nation
would have produced in the absence of the regime, it is difficult to concretely determine
just how many states have changed their behavior. Because the fossil fuel industry has
continued to grow in some regions, while stagnating or even shrinking in other areas, no
definite conclusions can be drawn about the exact level of behavioral change being made
by state and corporate actors.
Nonetheless, in general, participation in the climate regime has coincided with
nations being receptive to change. The Kyoto Protocol had relative success in changing
the emissions behaviors of the Annex I (developed) signatories (European Environment
Agency 2012, 7; Luomi 2020). Without limitations in place for developing countries,
however, it fell short. The Paris Agreement was designed to account for this shortcoming
and has shown promise for garnering compliance with each signatory drafting their own
NDCs (Luomi 2020). By setting personal targets for emissions goals, each signatory
nation has taken the first step toward changing their behavior. (1 point).

10

As discussed in the previous section, many powerful fossil fuel corporations have criticized the climate
change regime for being too harsh on economic actors. In taking the opposite stance to many scientific
bodies and civil society actors, many firms, through efforts like the GCC group, have tried to prevent and
avoid regulatory policy (Falkner 2008).
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iii. Over 70% of actors meet the regime’s regulations in their respective
issue areas.
Overall, there has been a high level of compliance within the provisions of the
climate regime. All parties to the Kyoto Protocol, for example, reached full legal
compliance during the first commitment period from 2008 until 2012 (Grubb 2016). With
the second Kyoto commitment period just having ended at the close of 2020 and the first
global stocktake of the Paris Agreement not yet having taken place, it is not certain how
compliance will look for current climate governance. However, it would be reductionist
to undermine the achievements of the climate change regime thus far based on future
prospects of non-compliance. Rather, it is more beneficial to acknowledge the
achievement of widespread compliance while remaining skeptical of how these
commitments translate to progression away from greenhouse gas emissions. (1 point).
iv. Positive biophysical impacts are observable after regime
implementation.
Since the inception and adoption of the UNFCCC and other global climate
governance initiatives, there have been no observable biophysical improvements in the
condition of the global climate. In fact, the climate situation has become even more dire
than in years past, with more widespread and intense heat across the entire globe (Luomi
2020). While this lack of positive change could be attributed to a host of non-humanrelated phenomena, the inability of humans to limit greenhouse gas emissions seems a
more likely cause. According to the 2019 UNEP Emissions Gap Report, “GHG
[greenhouse gas] emissions have risen at a rate of 1.5 per cent per year in the last decade,
stabilizing only briefly between 2014 and 2016” (UNEP 2019). This overall growth in
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global emissions since the inception of the Kyoto Protocol seems indicative of the failure
of the climate regime to produce positive biophysical results. (0 points).

IV.

Conclusion
Global Climate Change Regime
Market Relationship: Market-Enabling
Institutional Effectiveness: 3/4 (largely institutionally effective)
Ecological Effectiveness: 2/4 (partially ecologically effective)
The climate change regime, which aims to mitigate one of the most pressing

global environmental issues of contemporary consideration, has had limited success in
producing positive biophysical impacts. This conclusion begins by discussing how
industry actors played a role in the regime’s resulting levels of effectiveness. Then, it will
engage in a short discussion of the drawbacks of the chosen measures.
Although the enforcement of regime-based regulations has clear weaknesses, the
global climate change regime has shown impressive ability to dynamically coordinate
global effort around the creation and progression of climate change governance with a
score of three (3/4). Through the management of scientific bodies, the organization of
annual conventions, the creation of complex market-enabling mechanisms for the
bolstering of corporate support, the climate change regime has been largely effective as a
global institution.
In an ecological sense, the regime scored two (2/4), demonstrating its ability to
change global actors’ behaviors within its regulatory provisions but its larger failure to
bring about sustained emission reductions. The regime’s inclusion of carbon credit
trading and promotion of energy alternatives and carbon cleanup technology development
has enabled signatories of the Kyoto Protocol to meet their regulatory targets. However,
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the weakness of these emission targets has contributed to the regime’s larger failure to
bring about significant reductions in global emissions levels.
Despite many market-enabling mechanisms scattered throughout the regime,
many powerful global firms have continued to oppose the introduction of emissions
regulations, contributing to the overall failure of policy solutions. In order to better
understand this failure, the discussion shifts back to corporate actors and their
relationship to the regime regulation.
As the international energy system stands now, the fossil fuel industry is central to
the functioning of society. The increasing levels of global consumption creates a high
energy demand that is currently met by a fossil fuel-based infrastructure. Facing a
growing need for energy in the early days of the climate regime’s institutionalization,
many powerful companies and, as a result, government officials were not comfortable
risking damage to the economy to transition to alternative energy systems (Falkner 2008,
103). Instead, their resistance has supported the continued reliance of the globe on a
pollution-heavy fossil fuel-based energy system.
Another plausible reason for the failed transition away from fossil fuels is the lack
of institutional enforcement. As discussed above, the climate regime operates without
legally binding regulations. As a result, the consequences for noncompliance are
minimal, if there are any at all, and no international body is tasked with enforcement.
Patrick sums up the issue with this well when he says, “the core policy and regulatory
instruments to curb greenhouse gas emissions exist at the national level, and performance
therefore varies from country to country” (2013, 5).
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Finally, there is a lack of clear, economically competitive energy substitutes to
fossil fuels (Falkner 2008). While developing technologies, such as renewable and
nuclear energy markets, could provide alternatives to the fossil fuel dependence, they
have not been sufficiently developed yet.
This fact, taken with the two considerations above, has caused climate change
regulation progress to stagnate with respect to fossil fuel industries. In order to comply,
market actors would have to incur high costs for their development of a new energy
infrastructure. While the cost to comply is incredibly high, the lack of legally binding and
enforceable provisions has made the cost of defection minimal. If directly weighing the
cost of complying versus defecting from climate governance provisions, market actors
would be prompted to continue using highly polluting practices. This is, generally, what
has occurred.

This case serves as a demonstration of the importance of differentiating between
compliance and ecological effectiveness. When scholars equate behavioral compliance
with effectiveness, they may erase important distinctions between the regime outcome
and regime impact. While the global climate change regime has seen high levels of
compliance, particularly with the 100% compliance with the Kyoto Protocol, it has failed
to reduce global emissions levels. Rather, since the first commitment period of the Kyoto
Protocol, greenhouse gas emission levels have continued to rise at about 1.5 percent
annually (UNEP 2019). Even though the climate change regime has been highly
successful in garnering high levels of compliance, there have been clear failures to meet
the scientifically minded regime goals.
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This can be attributed to three failures in the institutional design of the climate
change regime, as described by Patrick and Grubb. Firstly, the regime, for a long time,
was unable to gain the support of key industrialized greenhouse gas emitters. Two of the
largest emitters of greenhouse gases were not participating in the Kyoto Protocol, as the
United States never became a signatory and Canada later withdrew (Patrick 2013; Grubb
2016). Without responsibilities taken by these important global actors, the efficacy of
regime compliance toward the overall goal of emission reduction has been diluted.
Additionally, Kyoto’s focus on creating provisions for so-called developed
nations excluded economically industrializing countries like China, India, and Brazil,
who have since become some of the globe’s largest emitters (Patrick 2013). Without
“quantified commitments” established for these crucial “developing countries,” global
emissions levels have been allowed to continue growing (Grubb 2016, 673). With the
2015 Paris Agreement better accounting for the rapidly industrialization of developing
nations in its provisions, this concern may disappear in the coming years. For now,
however, it remains.
Finally, Grubb explains that of the remaining 36 nations with quantified
commitments under the Kyoto Protocol, the distribution of actual emission reduction is
highly skewed. A large portion of post-Soviet era countries and members of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) relied heavily on the
JI and CDM mechanisms to receive carbon credits and meet their commitments (Grubb
2016, 2). While these nations technically remain within full compliance of the Protocol,
their actual reduction of emissions was limited.
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Because of the difficulty of attributing ecological change to the behaviors of
regime actors, scholars often use compliance indicators as a sign of regime effectiveness.
However, this case demonstrates that a regime may appear to be functioning well with
high compliance levels but fail to properly address the issue at hand. The ecological
effectiveness measure tried to remediate this downfall by accounting for both the
scientific content of regime provisions and actor compliance with these provisions to
substitute. However, after analyzing this case, this measure can be said to still rely too
heavily on compliance.
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Case 3: Global Oceanic Regime
Covering over 70% of the surface of the Earth, oceans are the foundation of all forms of
natural life. Oceans host a multitude of valuable resources, from water to marine animals
to a means for navigation and have served the interests of local, regional, and global
peoples alike. Because of the widespread participation in maritime activities, however,
the oceans and its resources are prone to overuse and exploitation. This dilemma, which
has been accentuated by the past century of rapid globalization, prompted the creation of
a regulatory global oceanic regime to manage the distribution of oceanic resources and
territory for the purpose of international fairness and resource preservation.
As a mechanism for the environmental protection of the oceans and their
resources, the global oceanic regime is a valid case to investigate within the parameters
of this study. However, the regime’s development was grounded in the regulation of
territorial sovereignty, navigation, safety, and economic practices in the oceans. As
scientific research continued to provide growing bodies of evidence that common oceanic
practices, such as dumping, drilling, and mining, were unsustainable and having
considerable ecological impacts, the regime involved environmental initiatives. While
these environmental aspects of the global oceanic regime are the focus of this study, the
regime’s ecological protection is embedded within issues of more traditional political
salience.
This case study will begin by discussing how the informal set of global oceanic
norms progressed into an institutionalized regime throughout the mid- and late-twentieth
century. The study will clarify how the development of various regime component parts
within the United Nations framework has shaped the overall regime structure. Then, by
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placing these norms, conventions, and regulations in direct conversation with global
oceanic industries, the next section evaluates the relationship of the regime to the
economic marketplace. Finally, the case study discusses the institutional and ecological
effectiveness of the regime and situating the case back into the context of an
interconnected web of global issues.

I. Background
While the existing institutionalized global oceanic regime has emerged since the
end of World War II, it has been strongly informed by the centuries-old debate over
national jurisdiction in the international seas. Historically, nations managed their
relationship between one another and the sea without a formal international structure of
governance. Rather, the widely held norms and ideas of oceans governance for much of
human history had focused on maintaining the “freedom of the seas,” or the absence of
national jurisdiction in the ocean, for merchants, fishers, navies, and other international
actors (Craig 2012; Mendenhall 2019, 27). As maritime competition between states
mounted in the 18th century, however, so did the tension between these ideas of freedom
and territorialization of the seas. Some states claimed parts of the high seas and its
resources under their national jurisdiction, and, as a result, the norms regarding behavior
on the high seas faced significant shifts (Mendenhall 2019).
This shift in the global oceanic norms coupled with the dramatic expansion of the
types and frequency of human activities on and under the sea in the early 20th century, the
post-war years demanded the establishment of regulations on unfair ocean practices to
preserve free global markets. This regulatory need, combined with many unilateral and
conflictual territory claims following the war, led to the international community to form

94

a unified “law of the sea” (Mendenhall 2019). This “law” has grown into the
contemporary global oceanic regime. This current system of ocean governance is
comprised of a series of conventions and governing bodies that have solidified the norms
around ocean-related issues.

A. Framework within the United Nations
Today, the global oceanic regime is grounded in the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Described as a “regime of law and order
in the world's oceans” that establishes “rules governing all uses of the oceans and their
resources,” UNCLOS has been deemed the “most comprehensive attempt to govern
international waters” to date (International Maritime Organization 2019b; Patrick 2016,
2). It begins with the definition of four oceanic territorial realms: the territorial seas
(twelve nautical miles from a nation’s coast), the contiguous zones (twenty-four nautical
miles), exclusive economic zones (two-hundred nautical miles), and the high seas (outside
of jurisdiction) (DOALOS 1982; Mendenhall 2019, 35-6). These territorial borders each
have coinciding regulations for a nation’s proper resource management and navigational
behavior.
While UNCLOS primarily focuses on oceanic jurisdiction, it does not shy away
from addressing oceanic environmental concerns. Part XII of the UNCLOS document
begins by outlining the signatories’ “obligation to protect and preserve the marine
environment” and their simultaneous “sovereign right to exploit their natural resources
pursuant to their environmental policies and in accordance with their duty to protect and
preserve the marine environment” (DOALOS 1982, 100). The rest of the section
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continues to suggest that signatories will cooperate in reducing all forms of marine
pollution through state and international law enforcement mechanisms.
After having established a legal framework for oceanic practices, UNCLOS
prompted the formation of three new institutions: The International Tribunal for the Law
of the Sea, the International Seabed Authority, and the Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf. The Tribunal is an “independent judicial body” in place for settling
international ocean-related disagreements (ITLOS 2021). The International Seabed
Authority has set out to promote sustainable practices through “organiz[ing], regulat[ing]
and control[ing] all mineral-related activities in the international seabed area” (ISA
2021). The Commission has been tasked with “establish[ing] the outer limits of the
continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles” (DOALOS 2012). These efforts, and others,
have facilitated the implementation of the immense UNCLOS framework.
Today, UNCLOS operates under its secretariat, the Division for Ocean Affairs
and the Law of the Sea (DOALOS). Despite 167 nations having become party to
UNCLOS, the United States has refused to ratify the Convention (Patrick 2016). Rather,
it has used its position as one of the globe’s leading naval and technological powers to
launch its own efforts into promoting safety and security standards in shipping through
initiatives like the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Container Security Initiative
(Patrick 2016). The disjointed involvement by a major global power is also illustrative of
the larger fragmentation present in the oceanic regime as a whole. Because of the wide
scope of global ocean-related issues, from piracy to pollution, no single agreement or
organizational body, even one as comprehensive as UNCLOS, has been able to oversee
all of the global effort for sustainable ocean governance (Patrick 2016). Rather, UNCLOS
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is an “umbrella convention” that works in conjunction with many other organizations and
agreements (Ehlers 2016).

B. Other Relevant Conventions and Bodies
Prior to UNCLOS entering force in 1994, the global oceanic regime was a series
of scattered efforts in various areas of oceanic governance. One of these first instances of
institutionalized ocean regulation came from the formation of the International Whaling
Commission (IWC). In response to dwindling global whale populations, the Commission
adopted the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling in 1946 to establish a
legally binding schedule of regulations on the whaling industry. Since 1986, the
Commission has placed a moratorium on all instances of commercial whaling
(Mendenhall 2019, 28).
Another early governance body within the regime was the International Maritime
Organization (IMO). A specialized UN agency, the IMO was founded in 1948 to promote
“safety and security of [global] shipping” practices (International Maritime Organization
2013, 2). Examples of their efforts include the 1966 International Convention on Load
Lines, the 1972 International Convention on Safe Containers, and the 1974 Convention
on the Safety of Life at Sea. These conventions deal predominately with protecting
human life while at sea by creating safe shipping practices.
However, as it has become increasingly evident that shipping practices are
causing damage to marine life, the IMO has taken a larger role in “the prevention of
marine and atmospheric pollution by ships” (International Maritime Organization 2013,
2). The 1972 London Convention and the 1978 International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) have promoted global environmental
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stewardship in shipping practices (Patrick 2016; International Maritime Organization
2019a; Mendenhall 2019). These conventions target pollution and dumping from ships,
as well as unsustainable fishing practices.
Taking on similar issues, but at a regional level, is the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP) Regional Seas Programme. Established in 1974, the
Programme is a series of 18 conventions and plans of action that work to protect regional
bodies of water, such as the Mediterranean Sea and the Caribbean Sea (UNEP 2017).
While tackling a host of issues from oil spills to disaster reduction, these multilateral
agreements have been able to function within a variety of cultural landscapes (UNEP
2017).
The wide range of focused multilateral institutions and agreements work in
conjunction with the broader UNCLOS to create a global landscape for the protection of
oceans. Though the regime’s components cover a comprehensive scope of marine issues,
from territorial borders to safety to marine species protection, the system is characterized
by fragmentation.

II. Relationship to Market (Independent Variable)
As described in the previous section, UNCLOS has established territorial borders
in the ocean and coinciding regulations on proper behaviors within each designated zone.
These provisions have provided a legal framework for the operation of transboundary
marine industries. When it is looked at in terms of its territorial focus, the global oceanic
regime can be said to facilitate, or enable, many economic activities. When evaluating the
global oceanic system of governance as an environmental regime, however, there is
another story to be told.
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A. Overview of the Ocean-Related Economy
The global oceans have long served as a means for economic activity and growth.
This maritime industrial activity has predominately taken place within three sectors:
maritime transportation, fisheries, and oil and gas extraction (Ehlers 2016, 189). These
industries, as central drivers of the period of industrialization and globalization, have
contributed to the establishment of the massive contemporary global economy.
As related economic practices and technologies have been implemented over the
past centuries, these three industries have progressed. However, the maritime industry has
never seen a shift quite to the scale of the contemporary movement for blue growth.
Defined by the European Commission as the “sustainable growth in the marine and
maritime sectors,” blue growth encourages corporations to participate in the sustainable
development of both existing and emerging ocean industries (Ehlers 2016, 195). These
new industries, such as aquaculture, coastal and maritime tourism, marine biotechnology,
ocean energy, and seabed mining are forming a so-called blue economy (Ehlers 2016).
This blue economy is developing and operating within the realm of the oceanic regime.
Although sustainability is promoted as an important aspect of the global economic
blue growth, many currently acceptable oceanic practices, when left unregulated, still
have serious environmental implications on marine ecosystems and oceanic health. The
ever-expanding tourism industry interferes with coastal habitats. Ocean energy industries
still facilitate pollution from ships, overfishing, oil spilling, and dredging, which cause
disturbances to the delicate balance of marine ecosystems. Even within the realm of socalled sustainable blue growth, it is these types of damaging corporate practices that have
encouraged global oceanic institutions to introduce strict environmental regulation.
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B. Industry Response to Ocean Regulation
In general, environmental regulation seeks to place limits on the acceptable
practices of corporate actors. Facing higher production costs because of these barriers,
these actors have historically tried to either prevent the creation of or avoid complying
with these regulations. This general position has been the predominant response to the
oceanic regime. During the regime institutionalization process, the negotiations of new
regulations on corporate oceanic practices have historically demonstrated this clear
tension between multinational corporations and oceanic protection.
One prominent example of global governance regulating environmentally harmful
practices is the International Whaling Commission (IWC). Originally established in 1946
as a voluntary organization, the IWC aimed to promote sustainable commercial whaling
practices (International Whaling Convention 1946). After initiating baseline regulations
in its first decades of operation and reevaluating commercial whaling as a threat to global
whale populations in the early 1980s, the Commission decided to “introduce a
moratorium on commercial whaling starting in 1986” (Mendenhall 2019, 28). While this
ban is still in effect today, many nations, including Japan, Norway, and Iceland who rely
on commercial whaling, have resisted the regulations by whaling commercially in
international waters (Japan Whaling 2019). As of July 2019, Japan withdrew from the
IWC, and it has publicly resumed commercially whaling (Japan Whaling 2019). Though
many nations have complied with the whaling regulations, there exists notable resistance.
Another example of this regulatory tension is the IMO’s MARPOL Agreement.
The first attempt in 1973 to enact regulations on marine pollution from ships was halted,
as lobbying efforts from the shipping industry prevented enough states from ratifying the

100

agreement (Mendenhall 2019). Parties returned to the negotiation table to discuss
granting concessions to the opponents, and the second attempt, MARPOL 73/78,
eventually entered force a decade later (Mendenhall 2019, 31). The delayed negotiation
of MARPOL is one example of how the attempts to regulate of unsustainable oceanic
practices have been diluted by backlash from global corporations.
While historically industries that benefit from the exploitation of resources have
opposed regime regulations, backlash has not been the only response, especially as of
recent. In 2009, the World Ocean Council was formed as an alliance to bring together the
interests of all ocean industries and promote “corporate ocean responsibility” (Holthus
2018; World Ocean Council 2021). Through hosting Sustainable Ocean Summits for
industry actors, the group has discussed the “development and implementation of
industry-driven solutions to ocean sustainability challenges” (World Ocean Council
2021). Though no major breakthroughs have occurred yet, the WOC regularly publishes
reports on promoting collective action for ocean industries. Additionally, with a more
condensed ocean industry position, the group is also collectively advocated for the
inclusion of industries at future global ocean negotiations.

C. Analysis of Regime-Market Relationship
As a complicated regime system with numerous moving parts, the overall global
oceanic regime is difficult to code as strictly market-enabling or regulatory. UNCLOS, by
creating global territorial boundaries and conditions under which transboundary marine
industries can operate equally, can be considered enabling of existing economic activity.
Therefore, when the regime is looked at in terms of its territorial focus, the global oceanic
regime can be said to facilitate, or enable, many economic activities. Although this is an
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important piece of the overall regime structure, for the purpose of this study, the
environmental parts of the global oceanic regime are more relevant to oceanic industries.
By enacting regulations, the global oceanic regime has presented challenges to
MNCs’ behaviors, and, as a result, has limited market activity in some capacities. These
types of contentious relationships between industry and regulation can be seen across
different marine industries, from whaling to shipping. Within the context of these
regulations, there have been few breakthroughs for alternative technologies and minimal
development of truly sustainable industries. Without clear oceanic industrial
developments, the global oceanic regime is coded as regulatory.

III.

Effectiveness (Dependent Variable)
With the context of the formation, development, and impacts of the global oceanic

regime, the study moves to a discussion of the regime’s effectiveness. Because this
project is particularly concerned with environmental regimes, the below evaluations
focus on the environmental implications of the global oceanic regime. These include Part
XII of UNCLOS, the IWC, the UNEP Regional Seas Program, the IMO’s MARPOL and
London Convention, and other international bodies and agreements. Beginning with
institutional effectiveness and then preceding to ecological effectiveness, the selected
indicators from the literature inform the ranking of the oceanic regime.

A. Institutional Effectiveness
i. The agreement was completed on the prescribed timeline without
major hold ups.
While the negotiations for UNCLOS originally began in 1958, disagreements
between states on the scope and terms caused delays. Following two more UN
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Conferences, the comprehensive UNCLOS III was finally adopted in 1982 and entered
force in 1994 (Mendenhall 2019). Although the agreement is an impressively complex
treaty on a host of global issues, including navigation, fishing, scientific research, marine
pollution, and territorial and jurisdiction claims, the timeline of many decades of
negotiations was far longer than intended. (0 points).
ii. The institutional framework has been revisited and updated at
least once since its original inception.
UNCLOS impressively establishes a general oceanic law for an expanse of
relevant issues. Despite the years of work put into the development of the UNCLOS
document, it has not been updated since it entered force in 1994 (Mendenhall 2019). As a
result, the aging Convention “does not adequately address a number of emerging and
increasingly important international issues,” particularly related to climate change
(Patrick 2016, 4; Mendenhall 2019).
That is not to say that there have been no advancements in the oceanic governance
in recent years. Initiatives within UNCLOS, such as the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement,
have been implemented in the years since the Convention was put into force (DOALOS
1995). Other organizations, such as the IMO, ITLOS, and the ISA are working to support
the framework set forth by UNCLOS (Patrick 2016). Despite these smaller acts, the
stagnation of the international community to reform and advance UNCLOS demonstrates
its lack of institutional functionality. (0 points).
iii. There are mechanisms in place for the enforcement of the
agreement, such as inspections or reporting.
UNCLOS establishes general oceanic regulations on state and industry behaviors.
In its provisions, the convention places the responsibility of enforcing these regulations
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onto individual states. For example, Articles 213 through 222 of UNCLOS describe the
responsibility of states to monitor and enforce international polluting behaviors
(DOALOS 1982). Placing this responsibility onto the involved states imposes a high
enforcement cost on individual states rather than spreading the cost across a group of
states. Additionally, this enforcement strategy has caused regional conflict, particularly
when dealing with areas of contested jurisdiction (Patrick 2016, 4). 11
Because of the reliance of the UNCLOS framework on states for enforcement,
other multilateral efforts have largely been unable to establish stronger surveillance,
capacity-building mechanisms (Patrick 2016, 4). The lack of strong external enforcement
mechanisms for holding states and industries accountable for their regulatory
responsibilities shows weakness in the institutional ability to cause behavioral change (0
points).
iv. The regime features mechanisms for the generation and
widespread distribution of information.
Article 200 of UNCLOS demonstrates that international actors understand the
importance of generating and sharing ecological information. It reads that “states shall
cooperate, directly or through competent international organizations, for the purpose of
promoting studies, undertaking programmes of scientific research and encouraging the
exchange of information and data acquired about pollution of the marine environment”
(DOALOS 1982, 102). While there is no explicit indication in UNCLOS of which
organizations should take on this task, many have. For example, the IMO, the
Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission of UNESCO, the International
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These instances of disagreement can be taken to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
(ITLOS), which hosts provides judicial proceedings related to UNCLOS (ITLOS 2021).
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Hydrographic Organization, and others have organized the exchange of scientific and
technical information (Mendenhall 2019). Though organization of scientific oceanic
discourse are a bit disjointed, there are coordinated efforts being made. (1 point).

B. Ecological Effectiveness
i. The regime’s specific goals were created in response to scientific
discourse.
The global oceanic regime, which is centered around the UNCLOS, was built to
solidify international norms around the “freedom of the seas” and territorialization. While
this is issue area is inherently linked to the preservation of oceanic resources, the bulk of
the agreement was not a direct response to environmental concerns.
Looking at the specifically environmental aspects of the oceanic regime, however,
there is more indication of a response to scientific discourse. Part XII and XIII of
UNCLOS, recognizing the sources of marine destruction, uses the concerns raised by
scientists to encourage states to conduct coordinated scientific research and collectively
take responsibility for preserving their marine environments (DOALOS 1982). Still, the
UNCLOS does not set specific goals to be achieved by global actors.
However, other international treaties, such as the IWC’s International Convention
for the Regulation of Whaling, the UN’s Fish Stocks Agreement, and the IMO’s
MARPOL 73/78 are prime examples of how scientific discourse can be transformed into
direct goals for global governance. Following growing concern of depleting whale
populations, overfishing, and hydrological destruction from ship pollution, each
organization has facilitated the creation of regulatory agreements (International Whaling
Commission 1946; International Maritime Organization 2013; DOALOS 1995). Landbased marine pollution has prompted the creation of the UNEP’s Global Programme of
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Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-based Activities. The
2010 Nagoya Protocol has aimed to “halve marine extinction rate by 2020” (Patrick
2013, 14). While each of these agreements has a varying degree of success in solving
their ecological challenge, the goals of the environmental realm of the oceanic regime
have generally been created in response to specific scientific discourse. (1 point).
ii. Over 85% of the state signatories changed their behavior during
the implementation phase of the regime.
Because of the fragmented nature of the global oceanic regime, it is difficult to
gauge exactly what percentage of signatories are responding with behavioral change.
However, by analyzing a sample of important oceanic environmental regulations, I will
estimate the level of behavioral change and code this measure accordingly. UNCLOS, the
IWC, and the UNEP Regional Seas Programme are three valuable examples of the
behavior change of the global oceanic regime.
Although Part XII of the UNCLOS does not establish concrete environmental
goals, it does provide a general “framework for marine protection” from pollution
(Mossop 2018, 577). This framework, with the additional support of the MARPOL
agreement, has resulted in most global actors moving away from deliberately harmful
shipping practices. Displeased with the long-lasting global moratorium against
commercial whaling, some nations, such as Japan and Norway, have returned to their preIWC whaling practices (Mendenhall 2019). Still, a strong majority of IWC signatories
have changed their nation’s commercial whaling practices (International Whaling
Commission 2021). Finally, the Regional Seas Programme, although disjointed, has
garnered the support of 146 nations in a series of regionally conscious agreements and
plans of action. Between the participation in a host of conventions and agreements to
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combat oceanic degradation, funding scientific research, and continued discussion, a very
strong majority of countries have changed their behaviors. (1 point).
iii. Over 70% of actors meet the regime’s regulations in their
respective issue areas.
Working within the regulations established by Part XII of UNCLOS, the IMO’s
MARPOL 73/78, the 1972 London Convention, and various UNEP Regional Seas
Programs, global actors have moved toward more sustainable shipping practices,
particularly related to polluting and oil spilling (International Maritime Organization
2019a; Mendenhall 2019). However, extensive land-based pollution, which makes up
about 70 percent of total marine pollution, still remains, presenting a more serious
problem (Mendenhall 2019). Despite attempts like the Nagoya Protocol and the UNEP
Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine Environment from Landbased Activities, global policy and norms have not been able to successfully target
widespread land-based pollution (Mendenhall 2019).
Regarding the protection of ocean species biodiversity, the IWC’s International
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling is generally regarded as successful with high
levels of signatory compliance. Recent defection by signatories within the Arctic region,
however, have signaled that the issue area may face some backsliding (Japan Whaling
2019). While the global effort to protect whale populations has been successful, the
protection of marine life against overfishing has been disastrous. The implementation of
the UN Fish Stocks Agreement and numerous regional fishery treaties has generally seen
low levels of compliance due to the widespread use of illegal fishing vessels and its
inability to effectively monitor fishing industries on a global scale (Patrick 2013).
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There has surely been some progress toward compliance with oceanic regulation.
However, there are many instances of defection in considerably important issue areas that
suggest the regime’s inability to promote widespread global compliance. (0 points).
iv. Positive biophysical impacts are observable after regime
implementation.
In looking to biophysical indicators of a host of ocean-based issues, it becomes
clear that the global oceanic regime has not caused a reversal of the negative trends that
prompted the creation of the regime. In the past four decades, there have been significant
reductions in the amount of ship-based pollution and oil spills (Mendenhall 2019).
However, instances of land-based pollution continue to flourish, presenting significant
problems for marine ecosystem health (Mendenhall 2019). Climate change trends have
continued to swell, prompting new challenges for global ocean ecosystems, such as the
acidification of wetlands and coral reefs and the melting of ice in the Arctic and Antarctic
regions (Patrick 2016). Following years of exploitative whaling practices, whale
populations are on a track to recovery. However, over 80% of the world’s fish stocks are
still depleted, despite widespread efforts to curb overfishing (Patrick 2016, 2; Mossop
2018, 574). While there have been some visible positive changes following the
institutionalization of the global oceanic regime, the overall trend of biophysical impacts
has continued to be negative. (0 points).

IV.

Conclusion
Global Oceanic Regime
Market Relationship: Regulatory
Institutional Effectiveness: 1/4 (institutionally ineffective)
Ecological Effectiveness: 2/4 (somewhat ecologically effective)
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The global oceanic regime, when evaluated in its capacity as an environmental
regime, has been limited in its success. In an institutional sense, the regime scored only
met one (1/4) criterion for effectiveness. The regime, which operates within the
framework of UNCLOS and other smaller conventions and agreements, has been
characterized by fragmentation. This disjointedness, when considered alongside the lack
of effective enforcement mechanisms and inability to restructure in the face of new
challenges, has rendered the global oceans regime largely institutionally unsuccessful.
As for its ecological impact, the regime met two (2/4) criteria for effectiveness.
While scientifically minded regulations have been enacted to counter the negative
consequences of destructive oceanic practices, the high cost of compliance has restricted
states and their industries’ willingness to make long-term changes. The regime’s inability
to garner consistent and full compliance from important state and corporate actors has
caused it to stagnate as a mode of environmental governance.

As a predominately regulatory regime, global ocean governance has historically
dealt with a combative position by market actors. With vested interests in the pollution of
marine landscapes and the exploitation of oceanic resources, many market actors have
resisted environmental policy creation, and if that had failed, have resorted to noncompliance. This failure to abide by regime provisions, then, has created the larger
inability of the regime to address the destruction of marine ecosystems.
Based on the narrative of the global oceanic regime, one explanation for these low
levels of effectiveness has been the failure of regime compliant technological
advancements to keep up with regulation. When a regulation is put into place, market
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actors have the choice to comply or defect. In complying, the firm must incur the cost of
adjustment to new practices, which often involves the adoption of new technologies.
However, there have not yet been sufficient, widespread technologies developed as
alternatives to harmful ocean industry practices, such as energy substitutes and waste
management strategies. Because the global oceanic regime has not allowed for the
establishment of a clear path for economic progression, many powerfully damaging firms
have made the decision incur the less costly penalties of defecting.
This lack of clear technological options for substituting industry practices in the
global oceans regime is also inherently linked to the pervasive nature of the global oceans
problem. Because of the extensive range of ocean-related issues, both territorial and
ecological, ocean governance has called for a complex system. With sources of marine
degradation coming from a variety of state and corporate actors, the policy solutions have
to target an extensive list of industries and actions. These targeted efforts, while
sometimes impactful on oceanic issues, often become lost within the larger framework of
the regime. Based on evidence of the fragmented character of the regime, the scattered
efforts to manage oceanic systems seem to stem from the scattered nature of the problem.
Another important consideration for this regime has been the ineffective
mechanisms for enforcement of regime provisions. In many of the ocean governance
agreements, coastal states are placed in charge of enforcing regulations. While there are
bodies, such as the ITLOS, that can be utilized in situations of international dispute, the
high costs of both adjusting to and enforcing regulations causes states and their industries
to have ample incentive to defect.
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Recent movements, such as the creation of the World Ocean Council and the
movement towards a blue economy might indicate that the market is at a turning point.
However, presently, the lack of support from these powerful corporate actors is
weakening the potential strength of the global oceanic regime.
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Case 4: Biodiversity Regime
Biodiversity is defined as the biological variety of living organisms and their ecological
surroundings on the Earth (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005). As living beings
and their complexes are constantly evolving, this multiplicity of lifeforms within and
across global ecosystems is constantly changing and progressing. Though elements of
biodiversity are variable, it has long been of value to human beings. From aesthetic
beauty to basic ecosystem services to economic opportunity, humans have an interest in
preserving biodiversity (Jóhannsdóttir et al. 2010, 140).
Despite biological diversity having both inherent and instrumental value for
humans, current trends demonstrate an increasingly large threat to global ecosystems and
their species. At the core of this threat is humanity, whose rapid development has created
the ecological conditions for mass species loss. Recognizing that human-caused
biodiversity loss will create conditions that are unsuitable for sustaining any life on Earth,
it has become increasingly imperative for global governance efforts to address
biodiversity.
The study of the biodiversity regime, as this case study will demonstrate, provides
a rich narrative on how a system of global governance can emerge from an immensely
complicated environmental issue. Despite the complexity, the institutional structure of the
regime has made significant progress since its inception in the mid 1970s, with provisions
that apply regulations on many global state and economic actors. While negotiating a
widely accepted regime framework is an impressive feat in itself, the agreements within
the regime have been prone to non-compliance. As a result, the positive ecological
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outcomes have been limited. Throughout this section, these evaluations of effectiveness
are placed in direct discussion with the regime-economic market relationship.

I. Background
A. Scientific Discovery and Progress
Throughout its history, the Earth has seen five mass extinctions of species, in
which biological diversity was seriously compromised. Based on a variety of biodiversity
indicators, scientists have shown that current trends of species loss are outpacing the rate
of loss even for these previous periods of mass extinction (Raven et al 2011; Cafaro
2015). Without any indication of this rate, an expansive body of scientists has concluded
that the Earth has entered a new sixth period of mass extinction (Millennium Ecosystem
Assessment 2005, 42).
While the causes of these previous mass extinctions are heatedly debated, the
body of scientists has generally agreed that this contemporary period of mass extinction
is caused by five “direct drivers” (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005, 8). These
causes of biodiversity loss include habitat destruction, invasive species, overexploitation,
pollution, and climate change (Cafaro 2015). Each of these direct drivers can be traced
back to the demographic, economic, sociopolitical, cultural, and technological
implications of humanity’s rapid development (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005,
8). Uncontrolled population growth and expansion of harmful business practices, in
particular, put increasing amounts of stress on the Earth. This realization that one of the
most serious threats to life on Earth is humanity’s destruction of global species has
sounded alarm bells and prompted the international community to address biodiversity in
global governance.
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B. Growing Pressure from the IUCN
The International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) was created as an
international organization in 1948 with the commitment to the protection of nature. As a
collection of government and civil society actors, the IUCN has served as “the global
authority on the status of the natural world and the measures needed to safeguard it”
(IUCN 2017). Its first decades in operation were dedicated to creating accessible
environmental assessments for understanding how humanity was impacting the
functioning of Earth’s ecosystem. Starting in the 1970s, however, the IUCN became a
driving central force behind the creation of biodiversity-related international agreements
(IUCN 2017).
Today, the IUCN has continued to represent the interests of a host of non-human
species. It has garnered the support of over 1,400 member organizations and has been
granted permanent status as a United Nations observer (IUCN 2017). The Union hosts the
IUCN World Conservation Congress every four years, where members and experts
discuss how human society can implement policy and measures in order to properly
transition to sustainable development.

C. Early Conventions for the Protection of Biodiversity
The collection of multilateral and international agreements that have constituted
the contemporary biodiversity regime can be traced to the 1971 Ramsar Convention on
Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat, also known as the
Ramsar Convention on Wetlands. In the 1960s, a host of ornithologists, with the support
of the IUCN, the International Council for Bird Preservation, and the International
Waterfowl and Wetlands Research Bureau, voiced their concern about the “global loss of
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migratory waterfowl habitat” (Griffin 2012, 7). This effort culminated in the Ramsar
Convention. By designating the “Ramsar List” of Wetlands of International Importance,
the Convention has committed signatories to cooperating for the preservation of wetlands
habitats and the waterfowl (UNESCO 1971). Its Conference of Contracting Parties (COP)
still meets in three-year increments to discuss the findings and resulting implications of
their Scientific and Technical Review Panel (UNESCO 1971; Griffin 2012).
In 1972, the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
hosted the signing of the World Heritage Convention, which creates a global plan for the
preservation of both cultural heritage and natural heritage. Backed by the IUCN once
again, the Convention simultaneously acknowledges national sovereignty and dons onto
State Parties the responsibility of designating and protecting World Heritage Sites within
their national territory (UNESCO 1972). To financially assist developing nations with
these new duties, the Convention also established the World Heritage Fund (UNESCO
World Heritage Center 2021). This explicit marriage of the cultural and ecological
importance of the Earth in the World Heritage Convention furthered the
institutionalization of the biodiversity regime.
Following the founding of UNEP in 1972, most of the subsequent biodiversityrelated conventions were established within the UNEP realm. The Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), which
entered force in 1975, is a legally binding international agreement regarding wildlife
trade. Article VIII explains that signatories must both “penalize trade in, or possession”
of illegal foreign species and “provide for the confiscation or return to the State of export
of such specimens” (CITES Secretariat 1973, 6). Today, the treaty maintains the integrity
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of global biodiversity by regulating the trade of 37,000 species of animals and plants
(CITES Secretariat 2019).
While CITES addresses the human transportation of species across borders, the
1979 Convention on Migratory Species of Wild Animals (CMS) tackles the protection of
migrating animals. Through observational research, CMS has designated the range of a
host of migratory species. This work by the framework Convention has allowed for
“internationally coordinated conservation measures” in the form of smaller regional
agreements or informal arrangements (CMS Secretariat 2020). Examples of these efforts
include the Agreement on the Conservation of African-Eurasian-Migratory Waterbirds
(AEWA) and the Agreement on the Conservation of Small Cetaceans of the Baltic and
North Seas (ASCOBANS) (Jóhansdóttir et al. 2010, 147).
These three framework conventions served as the original structure of the global
biodiversity regime for over a decade. While each is still in operation today, the growing
significance of biodiversity issues and pressure from international organizations, such as
the IUCN, led to the United Nations to begin working toward implementing a
comprehensive biodiversity convention. The UN Convention on Biological Diversity
(CBD) has served since 1992 as the centerpiece of the biodiversity governance system.

D. Development of the UN Biodiversity Framework
At the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (the Rio "Earth
Summit"), the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) was opened for signature
(CBD 2021). It entered force in 1993 and, with the support of its Subsidiary Body on
Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice (SBSTTA), began addressing its three
main goals: “the conservation of biological diversity,” “the sustainable use of the
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components of biological diversity,” and “the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits
arising out of the utilization of genetic resources” (CBD 2021). It spans across the globe,
working on biodiversity issues in all types of contexts, from marine and coastal areas to
agricultural regions to mountains (CBD 2021).
To achieve these three goals on wide scale, the CBD sponsored supplementary
agreements: the Cartagena Protocol and the Nagoya Protocol. Dating back to 2000, the
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety “seeks to protect biological diversity from the potential
risks posed by living modified organisms resulting from modern biotechnology” (CBD
2012, 1). By transparently sharing relevant information about the ecological damaging
effects of living technologies, the Protocol has promoted global biosafety. In 2010, the
Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of
Benefits Arising from their Utilization became the second supplemental agreement to the
CBD. This protocol directly addresses the third goal of the CBD, to promote global
access to genetic resources for the sustainable development of human society (CBD
2015; CBD 2021). Taken together with these protocols, the Convention on Biological
Diversity has served as the biodiversity regime’s home for nearly three decades.

E. Contemporary Regime Mechanisms
The biodiversity regime, seeing industrial practices as the foundation of
biodiversity loss, has targeted a wide variety of business practices from an even wider
body of international firms. The regime institutions have employed many mechanisms for
furthering its biodiversity goals. These include the creation of international targets for
biodiversity improvement, the introduction of frameworks that encourage national and
corporate regulation, and the facilitation of biological technology distribution.
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i.

Scientific Collaboration and Goal Setting

A multitude of scientific bodies have been working to synthesized information
regarding the current biodiversity trends. These organizations include the CBD’s
Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical, and Technological Advice (SBSTTA), the
UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre (WCMC) and the Intergovernmental
Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) (Jóhansdóttir
et al. 2010). Using compiled scientific findings, policymakers from the CBD and other
multilateral conventions have crafted targets in various areas of biodiversity, from habitat
conservation to marine species protection. The Aichi Biodiversity Targets are one
example of these global targets. Established within the 2011-2020 CBD Strategic Plan,
the Aichi Biodiversity Targets have set six strategic goals and twenty specific targets for
implementation by the signatory Parties (CBD 2020a). By encouraging collaboration, the
biodiversity regime has grounded its regulatory policy in scientific discourse.
ii.

Encouraging National & Corporate Regulation

While there are very few legally binding international agreements within the
realm of the biodiversity regime, the regime has encouraged states and corporations to set
their own biodiversity-related regulations. As is part of many international regimes,
“states are obliged to monitor the national implementation” of the biodiversity regime”
(Jóhansdóttir et al. 2010, 144). Using the international biodiversity targets and policy
suggestions set forth by the regime, states are instructed to enact national biodiversity
regulations. When regulations come from this national level, states have the capacity to
enforce them within their territorial borders (Tsioumani and Tsioumanis 2020).
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Beyond encouraging the state to establish legally binding regulations on certain
harmful practices, the biodiversity regime has also targeted corporations directly. Since
COP-8 in March 2006, “the business community has been officially asked to contribute
to the objectives of the Convention on Biological Diversity” (Houdet et al. 2011, 37).
Decision VIII/17, in particular, establishes the importance of having corporations
consider biodiversity when making their company strategies and policies. 12
iii.

Facilitating Biological Technological Distribution

The two biodiversity regime mechanisms mentioned above focus predominately
on the establishment of regulations, there has also been a considerable amount of stress
placed creating a collaborative global community that is committed to furthering human
development in a biologically sustainable way. The regime is bringing about this reality
through the creation of benefit-sharing partnerships. This strategy “builds scientific and
technological capacity within high-biodiversity countries, can promote legal and policy
regimes that protect the rights of countries, individuals, communities and corporations,
and can encourage sustainable development and the conservation of biological diversity”
(Kate and Laird 2000, 264). The Cartagena and Nagoya Protocols exemplify this goal, as
they seek to create widespread access to biological information and technologies.
Because of the difficulty in passing legally binding international agreements, the
bulk of international efforts on biodiversity protection is focused on compiling scientific
information and providing potential policy options, encouraging states and business

12
In order to achieve the Convention’s objectives, Decision VIII/17 at the COP-8 for the CBD
acknowledges the “the need to enhance voluntary commitments of the private sector” (Conference of
Parties to the CBD 2006, 1). It implores Parties to the Convention to encourage and support the transition
of corporate actors to biologically safer practices by raising awareness, providing guidance, and setting
benchmarks, and facilitating public-private partnerships.
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actors to enact regulation, and facilitating the fair distribution of biological technology.
These initiatives originate in numerous frameworks, conventions, and agreements.13 In an
attempt to bring together the many efforts for global biological diversity governance, “a
web of memoranda of cooperation and understanding have been created between the
secretariats of the CBD, the Ramsar Convention, the CMS, CITES, the World Heritage
Convention and the International Seed Treaty” (Jóhansdóttir et al. 2010, 143). This
collaboration aims to both “strengthen international governance and reduce duplication”
in these efforts (Jóhansdóttir et al. 2010, 143). Despite these attempts, the sheer scale of
the biodiversity problem and the number of relevant conventions, organizations, and
agreements has rendered the biodiversity regime fragmented.

II. Relationship to Market (Independent Variable)
A. Business and Biological Destruction
The biodiversity regime, as a collection of institutions, norms, and behavioral
procedures, is inseparably linked to a host of global industries. Historically, very few
global businesses have operated independently of their surrounding environment. Their
reliance on biological resources had characterized their operations for generations and
have led to the exploitative business practices that have caused biological destruction.
However, seeing that many corporate practices rely on natural resources, it is these very
businesses that have a stake in the reversal of negative biodiversity trends. This section

13

Here is an incomplete list of multilateral agreements that constitute the international biodiversity regime:
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD); International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling;
Ramsar Convention; World Heritage Convention; Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species (CITES); Convention on Migratory Species (CMS); United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS); UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD); Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement;
the Cartagena Protocol; the Nagoya Protocol; and International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food
and Agriculture (the International Seed Treaty) (Jóhansdóttir et al. 2010).
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will further explore this two-fold relationship between global industries and the
international biodiversity regime.
The rapid collapse of non-human species populations can be traced to the
enduring behaviors of many dominant global industries. Many industries, such as
logging, pharmaceuticals, and technology firms, rely on directly extracting natural
resources as raw materials in the production of products or services (Smith et al. 2019).
When placed in the context of a competitive marketplace, these practices are often
overused and can cause the depletion of valuable resources.
Damaging extractive practices have also been coupled with the highly pollutant
energy industry. The mining and burning of coal, oil, and natural gas both depletes global
natural resources and contributes to high levels of greenhouse gas emissions (Smith et al.
2019). Shipping industries, which facilitate the international trade of these extracted
goods, also actively contribute to high levels of species destruction through atmospheric
pollution and oceanic dumping (Ehlers 2016). This combination of resource extraction
and pollution makes for some dually destructive industries.
Other biologically damaging industrial practices include the demolition of
previously wild lands and native species. The construction of residential, commercial,
and government facilities have flattened natural habitats for the progression of human
society (Smith et al. 2019). Additionally, the operation of industrial agricultural practices,
such as monoculture cropping and concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs),
relies on the introduction of particularly economically efficient species (Kate and Laird
2000). By destroying habitats, introducing nonnative species, overexploiting, polluting,
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and contributing to climate change, these types of industrial business practices, among
many others, have triggered rapid biodiversity loss (Cafaro 2015).
It is clear that the interconnectedness of many industry operations with the Earth’s
natural resources has caused the degradation of global biodiversity. However, the Earth’s
vast biodiversity is also a keystone for many global industries, including agriculture,
forestry, fisheries, and tourism (Tsioumani and Tsioumanis 2020, 3). It is, then, in the
economic interest of some industries to support the regulation of harmful biological
practices. This distinction between corporations that benefit from having a violently
harmful impact on biodiversity and those that would prefer to operate on a biologically
diverse Earth has resulted in a level of duality in the regime structure, with some
strategies focused on regulation and others on facilitating sustainable economic
development.

B. Analysis of Regime-Market Relationship
While some aspects of the biodiversity regime have encouraged corporations to
develop and share new biotechnologies for more sustainable development, this type of
market opportunity is not sufficient to code the regime as market-enabling. Rather, the
principal provisions that have been enacted under the regime have placed restrictions on
land use or emissions levels. This restriction of free market action leads me to code the
biodiversity regime as regulatory.

III.

Effectiveness (Dependent Variable)
Overall, the global biodiversity regime is a complex system dealing with

biological diversity issues through a variety of norms, institutions, and agreements.
Although the system is fragmented by nature, it has been somewhat effective, particularly
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in areas of institutional effectiveness. The regime still has serious steps to take in order to
achieve higher levels of ecological effectiveness. In this following section, the
characteristics of institutional and ecological effectiveness are used to evaluate the
regime structure and performance.

A. Institutional Effectiveness
i. The agreement was completed on the prescribed timeline without
major hold ups.
Following years of scattered efforts to address different areas of biological
diversity, the international biodiversity regime was institutionalized with the creation of
the UN CBD. With pressure mounting from the IUCN and other civil society actors at the
end of 1988, the UNEP organized the Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts on Biological
Diversity “to explore the need for an international convention on biological diversity”
(CBD 2021). When this group decided that a convention would be necessary, it convened
another ad hoc group of technical and legal experts to begin the drafting and negotiation
process in May of 1989. This group, the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a
Convention on Biological Diversity, worked until the Nairobi Conference of 1992, where
the Convention was officially opened for signatures (CBD 2021). Although it took
decades for the international community to respond to the calls for action by biodiversity
activists, a comprehensive agreement was put into force in 1993, only five years after
collective international action commenced. (1 point).
ii. The institutional framework has been revisited and updated at least
once since its original inception.
While there are numerous parts of the overall biodiversity regime, a closer look at
the CBD provides a valuable demonstration of the ongoing efforts to keep the regime
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framework relevant. The Convention, which entered force in December 1993, has
gathered fourteen COP meetings and two extraordinary meetings of the Parties to the
Convention (CBD 2020b). While this group is primarily concerned with the
implementation of the Convention, the meetings have addressed emerging issues of
biological diversity. The increasing significance of biosafety brought about the adoption
of the 2000 Cartagena Protocol. Similarly, discussions about technology cooperation and
benefit-sharing prompted 2010 Nagoya Protocol (CBD 2020b). The CBD, as well as
other biodiversity-related conventions and institutions, are adjusting the framework of the
biodiversity convention to meet the needs of a changing world. (1 point).
iii. There are mechanisms in place for the enforcement of the agreement,
such as inspections or reporting.
The responsibility of complying with the provisions of the biodiversity regime
falls onto individual state and corporate actors. Historically, the regime has lacked an
international body with the responsibility and capability of enforcing this compliance.
Rather, states and corporations have been in charge of self-monitoring and reporting their
progress within biodiversity realms (Jóhansdóttir et al. 2010, 144).
Recognizing the challenges of self-reporting and no legal enforcement
mechanism, the CBD has initiated specific programs to encourage compliance from state
and corporate actors. For example, COP-12 and COP-13 brought about the Business and
Biodiversity Pledge, “which requires [its 140] signatories to report on their activities
related to biodiversity” (CBD 2018). With efforts like these, in CBD, in its 5th Global
Biodiversity Outlook report, explains that participation by states and corporations in this
self-reporting system has been increasing since the introduction of the regime (Secretariat
of the CBD 2020, 12). However, the lack of a governing enforcement body to monitor the
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progress of various actors within the biodiversity regime has rendered the mechanisms
less useful (0 points).
iv. The regime features mechanisms for the generation and widespread
distribution of information.
One of the major initiatives of the biodiversity regime has been to promote
collective scientific advancement in the field of biological diversity. International
organizations that serve this purpose include the CBD’s SBSTTA, the UNEP’s WCMC
and the IPBES, among others (Jóhansdóttir et al. 2010). These organizations, as well as
other agreements, such as the Cartagena and Nagoya protocols, have facilitated the
distribution of scientific and technical information to state and corporate actors.
The regime has also highlighted the importance of sharing this information about
biodiversity loss with the general public. Article 13 of the CBD dons on states the
responsibility to “promote and encourage understanding of the importance of, and the
measures required for, the conservation of biological diversity” with the public (United
Nations Convention on Biological Diversity 1992, 8). These efforts culminated at the
COP-8 with the introduction of the Global Initiative for Communication, Education and
Public Awareness (CBD 2018). The biodiversity regime has included mechanisms for
both the generation and dissemination of information throughout the international
community. (1 point).

B. Ecological Effectiveness
i. The regime’s specific goals were created in response to scientific
discourse.
There is a wealth of international scientific bodies that are researching issues of
biodiversity. Some groups have contributed specifically to the creation of policy choices
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for international agreements, like the International Waterfowl and Wetlands Research
Bureau at the Ramsar Convention and the Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts on
Biological Diversity at the CBD (UNESCO 1971; Secretariat of the CBD 2020). Other
initiatives, such as the U.S.-led Millennium Ecosystem Assessment and the UNEP
WCMC, are monitoring the overall health of the biosphere and evaluating the efforts of
the regime (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005; UNEP World Conservation
Monitoring Centre 2021). The input of the scientific community has played a central role
in the creation and analysis of the biodiversity regime. (1 point).
ii. Over 85% of the state signatories changed their behavior during the
implementation phase of the regime.
The 5th Global Biodiversity Outlook report, published in 2020, provides an
excellent overview of the implementation of the Aichi Biodiversity Targets from the
CBD’s Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020. The Aichi Biodiversity Targets
represent concrete ways for global actors to curb the rate of biodiversity loss. While these
targets do not capture the biodiversity regime in its entirety, the CBD’s relatively wide
base of support and centrality to the regime makes it a reasonable substitute to assess
regime effectiveness.
Based on information reported by the CBD signatories, 5th Global Biodiversity
Outlook suggests that each of the Aichi Biodiversity Targets has seen more than 80
percent of actors changing their behaviors toward their national targets for the protection
of biodiversity (Secretariat of the CBD 2020, 138). 14 Five of the Aichi Targets have seen
less than 85% of actors change their behaviors, with the other fifteen Targets seeing

14

Over 80% of actors are designated as on track to exceed, on track to reach, or have made some progress
but at an insufficient rate in each Aichi Biodiversity Target (Secretariat of the CBD 2020, 138).
126

above 85% behavioral change (Secretariat of the CBD 2020, 138). 15 When taken all
together, the average percentage of signatories who change their behaviors exceeds 85%,
making the regime an effective promoter of behavior change. (1 point).
iii. Over 70% of actors meet the regime’s regulations in their respective
issue areas.
In looking at the same data from the 5th Global Biodiversity Outlook’s report on
Aichi Biodiversity Target achievement, it becomes clear that the high levels of behavioral
change have not necessitated complete compliance from actors. Although an average of
85-90% of actors reported changing their behavior for the achievement of the Targets,
between 35 and 65% of these actors were not on track to meet their targets (Secretariat of
the CBD 2020, 138). None of the Targets are expected to see 70% of actors in full
compliance. (0 points).
iv. Positive biophysical impacts are observable after regime
implementation.
Some initiatives within the biodiversity regime have found success at reversing
negative biodiversity trends. With its List of Wetlands of International Importance, the
Ramsar Convention has created “the world’s largest network of protected areas with
1,915 sites, covering 187 million hectares” (International Institute for Sustainable
Development 2011, 2). Another success is the International Whaling Commission, which
placed a moratorium on commercial whaling that has allowed many populations of
species and stocks of whales to recover (International Whaling Commission 2021).
While there have been some biological recoveries seen after the implementation
of the biodiversity regime, overall levels of global biodiversity have not seen the same
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Targets 6, 8, 9, 13, 20 have between an 80% and 85% rate of behavioral change.
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reversal of trends. Using a diversity-weighted Living Planet Index (LPI)16, McRae et al.
estimate that there has been “a global population decline in vertebrate species between
1970 and 2012 of 58%” (2017, 1). Their work does not rule out the possibility that the
rate of biodiversity loss is currently slowing. However, evidence is not clear enough to
suggest a reversal of the negative trends in biological diversity. (0 points).

IV.

Conclusion
Global Biodiversity Regime
Market Relationship: Regulatory
Institutional Effectiveness: 3/4 (largely institutionally effective)
Ecological Effectiveness: 2/4 (somewhat ecologically effective)
As an institution, the global biodiversity regime has created the conditions for

swift, coordinated action for the reduction of damaging biodiversity practices, as
demonstrated by its score of three (3/4). It does have limitations, particularly dealing with
the strength of enforcement strategies built into the regime structure. However, it has
created functional mechanisms for information generation and distribution and allowed
for continued regime development. Although it has achieved considerable institutional
success, its ecological impact has been more limited, with a score of two (2/4).
International actors, although making strides toward the protection of biodiversity, have
not been able to meet the regime targets and have been unable to create sustained
improvements to global biodiversity levels.
Having a regulatory relationship to industry, the biodiversity regime has generally
dealt with a combative position by market actors. While many industries have economic

16

The LPI is a measure that analyses the state of global biodiversity considering the diversity of
vertebrate species populations from around the world (McRae et al. 2017).
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interest in biodiversity protection, a significant portion of powerful global firms further
themselves economically by exploiting natural resources and land. As a result of this
vested interest, many market actors have resisted environmental policy creation.
Nonetheless, biodiversity regulation, through agreements from the IWC and the CBD,
has been enacted, causing these deviant market actors to resort to non-compliance. As
demonstrated by the regime narrative, the failure of state and corporate actors to abide by
regime provisions has resulted in the larger regime failure to protect species and
ecosystem biodiversity.
As demonstrated by the discussion of the biodiversity regime’s institutional
effectiveness, there have been insufficient mechanisms in place for the enforcement of
regime provisions. While some agreements, like the ICRW, have imposed legally binding
regulations on actors, the majority of biodiversity targets are adopted voluntarily, without
enforceable consequences for defection. As a result, the cost of defection is rather low.
In addition to the low cost of defection, the scattered nature of the biodiversity
problem has contributed to the ecological failure of the regime. A host of market
industries, including fisheries to energy to land development, are contributing to
biological degradation. Although the regime is centralized around the CBD, there is a
complex of related conventions, agreements, provisions, and norms to deal with the host
of specific biodiversity issues. While sometimes these efforts have successfully
contributed to the mitigation of biodiversity loss, the regime fragmentation has caused
these efforts to become lost within the larger framework of the regime.
Additionally, because of the scattered nature of the biodiversity issue, there are no
technically feasible, economically viable solutions to the problem. Without a clear and
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unified path for the economic progression of market actors, many powerfully damaging
firms have made the decision accept the minimal penalties of defecting, rather than
incurring the high costs of adjusting to regulations.
In the theoretical argument, I hypothesized that the regulatory nature of an
international environmental regime would complicate the regime negotiation process and
negatively impact its institutional effectiveness. While this may have been observable in
this case, it seems more notable that the regulatory nature of the regime caused low levels
of actor compliance. This has translated to a wider regime failure to bring about the
biological regrowth it had hoped to.
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Chapter 5: Conclusions
After having carried out four in-depth analyses of international environmental regimes,
this chapter serves as a conclusion to this project. The first section brings together each
separate case study discussion to understand how an environmental regime’s relationship
to the marketplace has influenced its outcome and wider impact. The hypotheses, in their
original forms, do not fully account for this relationship. Rather, the case studies point to
a more nuanced version of the argument that better assesses the relationship of industry
actors and environmental regimes. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the
strengths and weaknesses of the methodological approach employed in this research
project and suggestions for future avenues of research.

I.

Results Overview
Each regime discussed in the previous chapter represents a unique set of

international rules, norms, and decision-making procedures focused around a particularly
pressing ecological issue. While each varies in their chosen strategies, there are general
lessons observable across the cases.

A. Analysis of Hypotheses
This study aimed to bring clarity to whether an international environmental
regime’s status as market-enabling or regulatory would be correlated to its effectiveness.
Based on literature about regime effectiveness and non-state actors in global governance,
I hypothesized that regulatory regimes would see (1) lower levels of institutional
effectiveness and (2) higher levels of ecological effectiveness than their market-enabling
counterparts. This expectation was based on the argument that regulatory regimes, as
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opposed to market-enabling regimes, would face pushback from powerful corporate
actors but include provisions that more suitably addressed the environmental concerns. In
looking to Table 5.1 where the case study information has been synthesized, it becomes
clear that this relationship does not exist exactly in this way.
Table 5.1 Overview of Environmental Regime Institutional & Ecological Effectiveness.
Regime
Strat. Ozone
Oceanic
Climate
Biodiversity
i.

Relationship to Market
Enabling
Regulatory
Enabling
Regulatory

Institutional
Effectiveness
4
1
3
3

Ecological
Effectiveness
4
2
2
2

Evaluating Hypothesis One

The first hypothesis states that when international environmental regimes are
market-enabling, they will be more effectively implemented at an institutional level than
regulatory regimes. The case study data does not indicate a clear connection between the
regime’s relationship to market actors and institutional effectiveness. The two marketenabling regimes had high scores of 3 and 4 in institutional effectiveness, and the
regulatory regimes earned scores of 1 and 3. While the regulatory oceanic regime had
lower institutional effectiveness than both market-enabling cases, the regulatory
biodiversity regime matched the score of the market-enabling climate change regime.
This similarity suggests that there is no discernable distinction in the institutional
functionality of regulatory versus market-enabling regimes. While the hypothesis cannot
be confirmed, it also cannot be discounted. Section iii offers an alternative explanation.
ii.

Evaluating Hypothesis Two

The second hypothesis expects that a market-enabling international environmental
regime will be less effective ecologically than one that is regulatory. The case data on
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ecological effectiveness does not offer support for this explanation. The market-enabling
regimes scored 2 and 4, while both regulatory regimes scored 2 points. Contrary to what
was expected in the hypothesis, the strictly regulatory regimes saw low scores of
ecological effectiveness, while the market-enabling stratospheric ozone regime was the
only case to demonstrate very positive ecological achievement.
This data shows that the presence of market-enabling regime provisions did not
cause a decoupling of the institutional and ecological effectiveness measures as the
theoretical argument had expected. Rather, the two measures of effectiveness seemed to
move, more or less, together, with the stratospheric ozone regime seeing the highest
levels of each, the climate change and biodiversity regimes in the mid-range, and the
global oceanic regime having the lowest scores of each.
Table 5.2 Broken-Down Environmental Regime Institutional & Ecological Effectiveness

Indicator
Strat. Ozone
Oceanic
Climate
Biodiversity
iii.

Institutional Effectiveness
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
Total
1
1
1
1
4
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
3
1
1
0
1
3

Ecological Effectiveness
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
Total
1
1
1
1
4
1
1
0
0
2
0
1
1
0
2
1
1
0
0
2

Alternative Theoretical Explanation

While the theoretical argument had expected that the mere presence of marketenabling mechanisms would change firms’ strategies and increase the regime’s
functionality, it seems more likely that the cost of these new opportunities and
technologies is of more concern for industry actors. When faced with new regulations on
existing industries and presented with new market opportunities, these actors seem to
complete a cost analysis of the situation. If the cost of complying (reducing harmful
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practices and incurring the cost of adjustment) is more expensive than the cost of
defection (continuing with harmful practices and incurring the cost of punishment), like
in the case of the climate change regime, the firms will choose to defect. When the cost
of complying is less than the cost of defection, like in the case of the stratospheric ozone
regime, the firm will be more likely to comply with environmental regulation.

B. Other Lessons
While the connection of a regime to the marketplace and its actors seems to be an
important consideration for regime functionality, this relationship does not
singlehandedly determine regime effectiveness. Rather, it operates alongside a host of
other mechanisms that create the conditions for regime success.
The first of these is technological substitutability. Market-enabling regimes can
exist only when there are less ecologically harmful substitutes to existing producing and
consuming practices. The CFC alternatives created under the stratospheric ozone regime
and the growth of renewable energy sources in the climate change regime demonstrate
this. However, the lack of these industry substitutes has limited the success in the global
oceanic regime and the biodiversity regime. Technically feasible and, as we saw above,
cost-effective alternatives provide the conditions under which an environmental regime
may find ecological success.
Another important consideration embedded within the cases is enforcement
mechanisms. As shown in Table 5.2, the stratospheric ozone regime was the only case to
both feature legally binding enforcement strategies for encouraging regulation
compliance (institutional effectiveness indicator iii) and to have visible positive
ecological changes (ecological effectiveness indicator iv). This suggests that the
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attainment of higher levels of ecological effectiveness is aided by strong legal
enforcement mechanisms.
Lastly, there is indication that the nature of the ecological issue and the resulting
structure of the regime institutions played into its effectiveness. The climate change,
oceanic, and biological issues are complex and multifaceted in cause and difficult to
understand scientifically. As a result, the three subsequent regimes are characterized by
fragmentation and have struggled to effectively address their respective problems.
Meanwhile, the issue of ozone depletion can be traced to a relatively small group of
industry behaviors and can be targeted much more directly. Thus, the global stratospheric
ozone regime is able to be concentrated within the UN Ozone Secretariat, under the
Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol. This distinction between centralized and
fragmented regimes, therefore, may have significant implications for the regime’s
resulting impact.

II.

Implications of Findings
Given the overview of results in the previous sections, this study can be placed

within the literature on non-state actors as drivers in global environmental governance.
Although the impact that the regime-market relationship had on regime effectiveness did
not match the original hypotheses, the study still indicates that corporations must be
considered significant actors in environmental governance. As many scholars have
suggested previously, the participation of multinational corporations can influence the
regime outputs, outcomes, and impacts.
The case of the climate change regime demonstrates that powerful firms may
lobby international organizations and governments to weaken regulations. While the goal
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of the regime is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions levels, corporations (and the
consumers they respond to) have provided pressure that has lessened the strength of
regime provisions. Even after years of full compliance by signatory actors, the regime has
not been able to reduce emission growth levels. With this case in mind, policymakers
must be cognizant of the balance between appeasing powerful corporate actors and
creating institutions with strong ecological regulations.
This study has also shown that the rate of technological advancements is a large
determinant of a regime’s ability to inspire positive biophysical progress. Again, the case
of the climate change regime demonstrates that even when a regime’s provisions account
for market activity and progression, it still may be unable to inspire ecological change. If
global governance is to properly address environmental issues without drastic shifts in
society’s consumption patterns, there must be continued deliberate public and private
research efforts to invent new technologies and markets.
Finally, this study demonstrates the importance of distinguishing between
compliance and ecological outcome. As Jackson and Bührs suggested in their 2015 piece,
scholars have too heavily relied on institutional indicators of effectiveness in assessing
the success of environmental governance. This study, particularly the climate change
regime,17 further demonstrates that compliance with regime provisions and positive
ecological change are not always coupled. Scholars, even within the field of political
science, should be deliberate about including assessments of the ecological impacts of
environmental regimes in their studies.

17

A more prolonged discussion of this can be found in conclusion of the climate change regime case study.
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III.

Methodological Considerations
Having drawn conclusions from the case study analyses, it is necessary to

reconsider the methodological approach taken for this study. The first consideration is
determining whether the dichotomous distinction between market-enabling and
regulatory regimes has been valuable for this research. For the purpose of this study,
market-enabling regimes were defined as regimes that use restrictions to deliberately
encourage new technologies and market opportunities to be created by private sector
actors. As noted in the methodology section, regimes often include provisions that exhibit
characteristics of both classifications. However, in acknowledging this, the prominent
market-enabling tendencies of some regimes still renders the distinction worthy of
scholarly consideration.
On the topic of analytical categories, the methods for assessing effectiveness were
not without flaw. Although the literature informed the creation of distinct indicators of
institutional and ecological effectiveness, each of these indicators was coded using a
dichotomous system, with a score of 0 signifying indicator absence and a score of 1
signifying indicator presence. While this scoring system accounted for a variety of
effectiveness indicators, it failed to consider the relative level of achievement within each
indicator. For example, the climate change regime and the biodiversity ozone regime
have both earned a 1 for the first indicator of institutional effectiveness (which states that
the agreement was completed on the prescribed timeline without major hold ups).
However, the timeline from the negotiation to the enactment of international agreements
took about 12 years for the climate change case and only 4 years for the biodiversity case.
In comparison to the decades of negotiations for the global oceanic regime, neither of
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these timelines are sizable. However, this erasure of case difference is certainly a
drawback of the chosen methodology.
In drawing conclusions from the analysis, it is also notable that only one regime
has achieved its goal of creating positive biophysical changes. Without multiple
successful regimes, identifying any causal mechanisms within the variables of interest is
unlikely. Despite the drawbacks of the small-n case study, this project provides a
valuable first attempt to understand the connection between the regime-market
relationship and regime effectiveness. This project can surely be expanded upon in future
research efforts.

IV.

Future Research
Seeing that corporate interest can have a significant impact on the resulting

effectiveness of international environmental regimes, this study indicates that scholars
should continue pursuing research within this topic further. While this particular study
drew four cases from the host of global environmental regimes, there are many additional
cases, such as the desertification and the hazardous waste regimes, whose analysis could
lend additional evidence to the acceptance or rejection of this study’s conclusions.
While the dynamics of global governance are of particular salience in an
industrialized and globalized world, regional governance on environmental issues, such
as the UN Regional Seas Programme, is also of concern. By moving beyond the global
scale and implementing a similar type of study with cases of regional environmental
governance, scholars may be able to understand how business responses to environmental
issues may change in response to geo-political and geo-economic factors.
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Finally, the interconnectedness of environmental issues has created interlinkages
between distinctive international environmental regimes. For example, as issues of
atmospheric disruption, ozone depletion and global warming are inherently linked. The
resulting stratospheric ozone and climate change regimes, thus, have built off of one
another in terms of establishing legitimacy, their institutionalization, and gaining support.
While it is beyond the scope of this study to address explicit regime linkages, this
growing area of scholarship may have interesting and important implications for future
studies of market-regime relationship.

V.

Conclusion
In conclusion, this study represents an early attempt within the context of

international environmental regimes to bring together discussions of institutional and
ecological effectiveness with corporate interest. While this project has some
methodological flaws, the four case studies demonstrate that corporations, as major
contributors to environmental degradation with immense force from global capital, do
have significant influence over the unraveling of global environmental governance. When
market-enabling regime provisions provide major corporate actors with cost-saving
opportunities, they are more likely to contribute to the regime efforts to bring about
positive ecological change. However, when the cost of compliance with regime
provisions, whether market-enabling or regulatory, is higher than the cost of defection,
corporations elect to continue contributing to ecological destruction.
As the threat of environmental disaster looms around the globe, it is becoming
increasingly imperative for governance efforts to create both institutionally and
ecologically effective institutions. Previous research has shown that many considerations,
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such as the availability of technological advancements, regime enforcement mechanisms,
and issue fragmentation, may impact how successful a regime may be. However, this
study indicates that corporate actors, as drivers of large-scale environmental change, are a
largely untapped key to solving contemporary environmental crises. This model can be
continually used to analyze the correlation between the market-regime relationship and
subsequent regime success in the context of global environmental governance.
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